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SUMMARY 
 
 
The primary purpose of this treatise is to revisit and reconsider the development of the 
review test set out in the Constitutional Court judgment of Sidumo & another v 
Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & Others (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC) and consequently 
ascertain the correct approach to be adopted by our Labour Courts in the application 
of such test.  The secondary purpose, entail the determination of the extent to which  
Labour Court judges interfere with the merits of awards and the resulting impact on the 
distinction between appeal and review.  In order to establish whether the test for review 
was correctly developed and to determine whether our review proceedings deter 
recurrent interference by our judges, an edifying consideration of judicial review in 
South Africa, an extensive analysis of various judgements pertaining to such 
development, followed by a comprehensive comparison with the United Kingdom`s 
application of review proceedings and judicial composition are made.  The research 
methodology is based on a contour of Sidumo, commencing with the Sidumo 
judgment, followed by three contentious Labour Appeal Court judgments and 
concluding with a Supreme Court of Appeal judgement, which clarifies the operation 
of the review test. The contour is interlinked with the notion of reasonableness. 
 
The primary research findings are identified in the judgment of Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd 
(2013) 34 ILJ 2795 (SCA).  The judgment, concluding the Sidumo contour, underlines 
the current position in our law and consequent narrower approach.  A comparison 
made with the United Kingdom, differentiate between such approach implemented by 
our courts and the strict gross unreasonableness approach applied by Employment 
Appeal Tribunals, recognising the finding, that our Labour Court judges ardently 
interfere with the merits of awards.  In the conclusion it is submitted that our labour law 
jurisprudence will constantly evolve, dictated by our courts interpretation of lawfulness, 
reasonableness and fairness.    
 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On 5 October 2007, the Constitutional Court handed down a significant and historical 
judgment concerning our labour-law jurisprudence, in Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum 
Mines.1  This judgment was eagerly awaited by both employers as well as employees 
and was of significant importance to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration 2  and other relevant bargaining councils.  However, the findings 
encapsulated in Sidumo were not without controversy.  At that time, as well as at 
present, there were various debates regarding the key findings by the Constitutional 
Court in relation to the court a quo.  Such key findings entailed firstly, that the 
commissioner is not required to show a measure of deference concerning the decision 
of employer, as held by the Supreme Court of Appeal,3 and that the commissioner 
must subsequently decide whether the decision of the employer was fair in considering 
all the relevant circumstances, thus rejecting the professed reasonable-employer test 
in our law.  Secondly, the court held that the review grounds, legislated under the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act4 (PAJA), do not apply and thus held that 
commissioners are obliged to make reasonable decisions within the provisions of 
section 145 of the Labour Relations Act5 (LRA).  However, the principal and most 
significant finding made by the Constitutional Court, entailed the suffusion of the 
Constitutional ground of reasonableness into section 145 of the LRA.  This 
pronouncement involved the application of the so-called Sidumo test and thus sought 
to give a sense of direction concerning the review grounds within section 145.  It was 
set out as a stringent result-based test, ascertaining whether the decision reached by 
the commissioner was one that a reasonable decision-maker could not have reached.  
The test will only be met if the result of the award falls outside a notional band of 
reasonable decisions and, consequently in the process, maintaining the distinction 
between an appeal and review.6 
                                                          
1  [2007] 12 BLLR 1097 (CC). 
2  Hereafter referred to as CCMA.  
3  Hereafter referred to as SCA. 
4  3 of 2000. 
5  66 of 1995.    
6  Myburgh “The test for review of CCMA arbitration awards: an update” 2013 23 Contemporary 
Labour Law. 
2 
 
However, the redoubtable finding in Sidumo was deflated by a trio of contentious 
Labour Appeal Court judgments.  Gaga v Anglo Platinum Ltd,7 Afrox Healthcare Ltd v 
CCMA8 and Herholdt v Nedbank,9 endeavoured to clarify the operation of the review 
test and in the process introduced a more lenient and relaxed approach to the 
application of CCMA-arbitration reviews.  These judgments were all formulated on the 
minority judgment in Sidumo concerning Ngcobo J`s gross irregularity dictum and 
endorsing the so-called test for prejudice, confirming that CCMA awards can be 
reviewed on section 145 and on the additional ground of unreasonableness, resulting 
in the diluting of the test set out in Sidumo and consequently opening the door for more 
frequent interference of arbitration awards by our Labour Courts.  
 
Such misapplication and deviation from the Sidumo contour by the Labour Appeal 
Court, distorted the proverbial line between appeal and review and thus encouraged 
applicants on review to rather base their application on a gross irregularity or dialectical 
unreasonableness.10  
 
Accordingly, the SCA in Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd,11 and a subsequent LAC judgment 
of Gold Fields Mining SA (Pty) Ltd v CCMA,12 stepped in and sought to correct such 
broad approach established by the trio of judgments, by ascertaining a more restricted 
approach.  Such re-establishment of the Sidumo contour reflected the true meaning 
set out in section 145 of the LRA, relating to the review ground of gross irregularity, as 
well as the stringent nature of the Sidumo test.13  Therefore, ensuring that awards are 
not lightly interfered with and preserving the distinction between appeal and review.  
Even though the Sidumo contour has been re-established and developed, the concern 
is, however, the extent of interference by our Labour Court judges that remains in the 
application of our review proceedings. 
 
                                                          
7  (2012) 33 ILJ 329 (LAC). 
8  (2012) 33 ILJ 1381 (LAC). 
9  (2012) 23 ILJ 1789 (LAC). 
10  Infra Ch 4. 
11  (2013) 34 ILJ 2795 (SCA). 
12  [2013] ZALAC 28 (4/11/2013). 
13  Infra Ch 5. 
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In revisiting Sidumo, the research design and theme are illustrated in the form of a 
contour, which entails the assessment of the origin and basis of our review 
proceedings, the 2007 judgment of Sidumo, the trio of contentious Labour Appeal 
Court judgments and culminates in the evaluation of the contemporary judgments of 
Herholdt and Gold Fields.  The core aspect-forming part of the research, and 
subsequently the Sidumo passage, is the notion of reasonableness.  Such notion was 
entrenched by Sidumo into our labour jurisprudence and in particular into section 145.  
Even though Sidumo based such suffusion on the Constitutional standard of 
reasonableness, Navsa AJ, interestingly relied on Bato Star Fishing v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 14  which in turn made reference to R v Chief 
Constable of Sussex, 15  where Lord Cooke established a simpler test for 
unreasonableness.  Such reliance and consideration of the United Kingdom’s 
jurisprudence, prompt a comparative approach in considering the application of the 
notion of reasonableness in the United Kingdom and in particular the judicial medium16 
applying such notion.   
 
Such comparative analyses, emphasises the lighter test for unreasonableness 
endorsed by our Labour Courts in comparison with the more stringent test for gross 
unreasonableness in the United Kingdom, thus prompting our Labour Court judges to 
interfere with the merits of a particular case.  Even though the Sidumo contour 
culminates in the narrowing of such interference by our Labour Court judges, the 
question remains what the motive for such interference is illustrated by the broad 
application of the notion of reasonableness and consequently, how to prevent such 
interference.  The true intention of the legislature, reflected in the course of the treatise, 
is to maintain a unique distinction between appeal and review.  Such distinction is, 
however, to a certain extent, distorted in the application of our review proceedings.  
Therefore, the ultimate consideration is whether the notion of reasonableness can be 
applied by our Labour Court judges with a measure of confidence in our CCMA 
commissioners and in the process limit the interference regarding the merits and thus 
upholding the distinction between appeal and review.  
  
                                                          
14  2004 (4) SA 490 (CC). 
15  [1998] All ER (D) 568. 
16  Employment Tribunals & Employment Appeal Tribunals.  
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND OF REVIEW PROCEEDINGS 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the key issues that had to be attended to in Sidumo & Another v Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines Ltd,17 related to the aspects of review proceedings and the subsequent 
application of same by our Labour Courts. In order to comprehend the noteworthiness 
of the finding, it is imperative to understand the foundation of the review proceedings 
in our labour law.  Therefore, this chapter will proceed with a brief consideration of the 
basis of the grounds for review found in the Labour Relations Act18 (LRA) and setting 
out the essential distinction between appeals and the grounds for review in section 145 
of the LRA.   
 
In establishing the basis and origin of the grounds for review, the chapter will refer to 
the Arbitration Act,19 signifying the intention of the legislature when drafting the above 
mentioned legislation. However, since the advent of the Constitutional era, the basis 
of reviews is based on the constitutional principle “that all administrative action must 
be reasonable”.20  Conversely, this resulted in the labour courts looking at arbitration 
awards afresh and consequently decided what the court would have done as the court 
of first instance, resulting in the consideration of the merits of the case and as a result 
distorting the distinction between appeal and review.  The basis is thus to consider the 
determination of such distinction. In the past, such distinction was based on the well-
known case of R v Dhlumayo, 21  setting out recognisable principles for appeal.  
However, the new distinction is based on whether the decision is capable of 
justification, thus falling within range of the reasonable decision maker.  The judgment 
of Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus22 in this regard will thus be considered, in particular 
                                                          
17  [2007] 12 BLLR 1097 (CC). 
18  66 of 1995. 
19  42 of 1965. 
20  S 33(1) of the Constitution provides that: “(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that 
is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.  
21  1948 (2) SA 678 (A). 
22  (1998) 19 ILJ 1425 (LAC). 
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the laying of the basis for the Sidumo contour and the ultimate course of preservation 
of such distinction. 
 
The relevance of the distinction between appeals and reviews will be noted in the 
development of Sidumo, where the courts continuously endeavour to summon a 
stricter approach in review proceedings and thus command for the preservation of such 
distinction.  
 
The abovementioned rationality, also interpreted as reasonableness, will be 
considered in the discussion of the Carephone judgment.  The application of the notion 
of reasonableness can be applied effortlessly in the review of the “penalty” imposed.  
However, the review of “factual findings”, “sanctions” and “discretion”23 presents a 
difficulty.24  
 
2.2. FOUNDATION OF REVIEW PROCEEDINGS IN SOUTH AFRICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE  
 
In South African labour law, judicial review concerns the process where a superior 
court, in particular the Labour Court, is endowed with the power to determine, scrutinise 
and set aside awards made by organs of state and private or individual bodies on the 
basis of certain grounds of review.25 
 
Prior to 1994, the South African common law governed the “inherent” jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court, providing the High Court with the power to oversee the legality of all 
the actions of the state organs.26  However, in the post-democratic era, the High Court 
now enjoys the exercise of such powers, not in terms of our common law, but under 
the Constitution27 and subsequent legislation enacted accordingly.28  
                                                          
23  Decision relating to postponement, compensation, severance pay. 
24  Myburgh “Reviewing of CCMA Arbitration Awards” LLM course-work lecture, Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan University, 1 March 2014. 
25  Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution (2013) 278. 
26  Ibid. 
27  The Constitution. 
28  Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 278. 
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Private arbitrations on the other hand were and are still continuing to be regulated by 
legislation.  The Arbitration Act, 29  in section 33(1), sets out specific grounds to 
challenge a matter on review: 
 
“(1)  Where – 
 
(a)  any member of an arbitration tribunal has misconducted himself in 
relation to his duties as arbitrator or umpire; or 
(b)  an arbitration tribunal has committed any gross irregularity in the 
conduct of the arbitration proceedings or has exceeded its powers; or 
(c)  an award has been improperly obtained,  
 
the court may, on the application of any party to the reference after due notice 
to the other party or parties, make an order setting the award aside.” 
 
It is accordingly not surprising that the legislature in 1995 based the LRA on such 
conservative piece of legislation, in formulating a narrow review action in labour 
disputes, making it more difficult for parties to succeed.  Thus, section 145(2) of the 
LRA is mirrored on section 33 of the Arbitration Act, where it provides: 
 
“(2)  A defect referred to in subsection (1), means – 
 
(a)  that the commissioner- 
(i)  committed misconduct in relation to the duties of the 
commissioner as an   arbitrator; 
(ii)  committed a gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration 
proceedings; or 
(iii)  exceeded the commissioner's powers; or 
(b) that an award has been improperly obtained.” 
 
Such limited scope contained in section 145 produced a school of interpretation, 
justifying that proceedings against arbitration awards could be instituted not only under 
the auspices of section 145, but also under section 158(1)(g) of the LRA based on the 
Labour Court’s discretion, subject to section 145, to: 
 
“review the performance or purported performance of any function provided for in 
this Act on any grounds that are permissible in law”.30 
 
                                                          
29  42 of 1965. 
30  S 158(1)(g). 
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Such interpretation had consequently been regarded as a permissible course for 
reviewing arbitration awards.  However, Froneman DJP, in Carephone, in referring to 
the judgment of the court a quo, confirmed Mlambo J’s refusal to invoke the power of 
review in terms of section 158(1)(g), and his conclusion that review of arbitration 
proceedings under the auspices of the Commission must proceed under section 145 
of the LRA.31 
 
Such strict nature of the LRA is observable in the abolition of the right to appeal against 
decisions of the Industrial Court in terms of the LRA.  Such right to appeal was replaced 
with the right to take the commissioner’s decision only on review to the Labour Court.  
It is thus apparent, from the inception of the LRA, that legislature sought to limit the 
potential grounds of review and the measure of interference by the Labour Court.  The 
process of referring a decision or ruling to a superior court was thus restricted to that 
of review proceedings. 
 
2.3. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN APPEALS AND REVIEWS  
 
The Labour Court is only endowed with review powers in relation to awards and rulings 
by CCMA or bargaining council commissioners, where the Labour Appeal Court on the 
other hand, hears appeals from the Labour Court itself.  Even though appeals and 
reviews are of similar nature and purpose, there are various differences that provide a 
clear distinction between them.32 
 
Appeals entails a re-hearing, concerned with the merits limited to the evidence on 
record and questions whether the decision of the court a quo was correct. 33  
Conversely, reviews are not concerned with the merits of the evidence on record, as 
this limited rehearing only questions whether the procedure implemented was formally 
and procedurally correct.34  Appeal is thus directed at the result of the hearing, where 
review is focused on the method by which the result was reached.35 
                                                          
31  Carephone v Marcus par 29. 
32  Van Tonder Labour Court Practice (2014) 297. 
33  Ibid. 
34  Ibid.  
35  Ibid. 
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The LRA thus provides a limited platform to challenge the procedure implemented by 
the arbitrator.  Such limited grounds include gross irregularities committed by the 
arbitrator in the conduct of proceedings, arbitrators exceeding their powers and 
misconduct committed by arbitrators in the performance of their duties.36  However, 
since the enactment of the LRA the Labour Courts started to push the boundaries, with 
the view that our Labour Courts should have the power to do more than merely review 
the procedure implemented by the arbitrator,37 resulting in the distortion of such clear 
distinction established by our common law.38  This deviation is the result of value 
judgments made by our Labour Court judges, resulting in the interference with the 
arbitrator’s decision and consequently opening the door for the review of the merits.39 
 
2.3.1. R v DHLUMAYO 
 
This judgment of the Appellate Division40 (as it then was) emphasised the importance 
that a distinction must be maintained between review and appeal.  Davis AJA held that, 
if the Appellate Court is satisfied that the judicial officer in the court of first instance has 
erred, the Appellate Court will reverse such decision whether or not there has been 
concurrence in the judicial officer’s finding of fact by an intermediate Appellate Court.41   
 
The Honourable appellant judge consequently summarised his conclusion in the form 
of principles which should guide the Appellate Court in appeal relating to facts.  Some 
of such noteworthy principles bear repeating.  For instance, the trial judge has 
advantages, which the Appellate Court cannot have, in that the trial judge experiences 
the atmosphere of the trial, seeing and hearing the witnesses.  The Appeal Court could 
                                                          
36  S 145 of Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, Review of Arbitrations Awards. 
37  Van Tonder Labour Court Practice 299. 
38  Ibid. 
39  Van Tonder Labour Court Practice 300. 
40  The Appellate Division was created as a purely Appellate Court superior to the provincial 
divisions. In 1994 the Constitutional Court was created with jurisdiction superior to the Appellate 
Division but only in constitutional matters. In 1997 the Appellate Division became the Supreme 
Court of Appeal and the provincial divisions became High Courts. 
41  Davis AJA in R v Dhlumayo 594, explained that, although our method of dealing with appeals is 
in most respects like that in England, we know nothing of the English practice in regard to 
“concurrent findings of fact by two courts”, which has sometimes been said to increase still further 
the reluctance of the final Appellate Court to interfere. 
9 
thus hardly ever be in a better position than the trial judge with regard to the demeanour 
of the witness, and consequently be very reluctant to upset the findings of the trial 
judge.  In observing particular people at the trial, the trial judge is in a better position 
than the Appellate Court in drawing inferences.  Furthermore, should there be a 
misdirection of fact by the trial judge, it is presumed that his conclusion is correct and 
the Appellate Court will reverse such decision only where it is convinced that it is 
wrong.  Thus, if the Appellate Court is left in doubt as to the correctness of the 
conclusion by the court a quo, then the court will uphold it.  Should the trial judge have 
overlooked certain facts or probabilities, the Appellate Court would tend to disregard 
his findings, as a whole or in part, and thus come to its own conclusion.  Accordingly, 
the Appellate Court is determined to seek reasons adverse to the conclusion of the 
trial judge.  As no judgment can ever be “perfect and all-embracing”, and just because 
a matter has not be mentioned, it does not imply that it should not be considered.42 
 
In consideration of these principles, it is evident that the court, in an appeal of fact, will 
interfere where other facts and probabilities have been overlooked.43  This is however, 
similar in nature to the notion that an award can be set aside if it is not justifiable with 
regard to the reasons given.44  This notion set out in Carephone thus clouds the 
distinction between appeal and review, in that mistakes of fact and law, subject to 
certain exceptions, are insufficient grounds for interference. 45  
 
2.3.2. CAREPHONE AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW   
 
In Carephone the LAC had to establish the “nature” and “extent” of the court`s powers 
relating to the review of CCMA arbitration awards.46  The “extent” of such powers was 
confirmed to be limited to section 145.47  The “nature” of the court`s powers was based 
on the administrative-justice section in the Bill of Rights,48 confirming that, although the 
CCMA was not judicial in nature, it was both bound by the constitutional provision 
                                                          
42  R v Dhlumayo 594. 
43  Toyota SA Motors (Pty) Ltd v Radebe (2000) 21 ILJ 340 (LAC) par 39. 
44  Infra par 2.3.2. 
45  Toyota par 39. 
46  Carephone v Marcus par 2. 
47  Supra ft 20. 
48  Supra ft 4. 
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governing organs of state and public administration, as well as the Bill of Rights.  
Therefore, such administrative status, obliged CCMA commissioners to ensure 
fairness, impartiality, equitability and an unbiased approach during such proceedings.  
Froneman DJP thus expressed and described the above mentioned limitations:49 
 
“The constitutional imperatives for compulsory arbitration under the LRA are thus 
that the process must be fair and equitable, that the arbitrator must be impartial 
and unbiased, that the proceedings must be lawful and procedurally fair, that the 
reasons for the award must be given publicly and in writing, that the award must 
be justifiable in terms of those reasons and that it must be consistent with the 
fundamental right to labour practices.”50 
 
The constitutional imperatives referred in the above mentioned dictum, “that the award 
must be justifiable in terms of those reasons given” 51  introduces, according to 
Froneman DJP: 
 
“a requirement of rationality in the merit or outcome of the administrative decision. 
This goes beyond mere procedural impropriety as a ground for review, or 
irrationality only as evidence of procedural impropriety”.52 
 
Therefore, the scope of review of arbitration awards was extended as well as a need 
for the consideration of the merits of the outcome established.  Consequently, the 
review of such awards would no longer be limited to procedural wrongdoing nor 
evidence thereof.53  However, the honourable judge advised that it would be inaccurate 
to attempt to distort the distinction between review and appeal.54 
 
Froneman DJP, in his observation of the plain meaning of justifiable,55 explained that 
such meaning does not require the abolition of the difference between review and 
appeal, in that it does not require administrative action “to be just, justified and correct”, 
but merely requires the aptitude in demonstrating to be “just, justified and correct”.56  
                                                          
49  Carephone v Marcus par 20. 
50  Ibid. 
51  S 33(2) and item 23(b) of schedule 6 of the Constitution. 
52  Carephone v Marcus par 31. 
53  Ibid. 
54  Carephone v Marcus par 32. 
55  According to the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary “justifiable” means “able to be legally or 
morally justified, able to be shown to be just, reasonable, or correct; defensible”. It does not mean 
“just”, “justified” or “correct” – see Carephone v Marcus par 32. 
56  Carephone v Marcus par 31. 
11 
To limit such distinction between review and appeal, Froneman DJP emphasised that 
of importance is: 
 
“the constitutional separation of the executive, legislative and judicial authority of 
the state administration, as well as the foundational values of accountability, 
responsiveness and openness in a democratic system of government (s 1(d) of the 
Constitution). The former provides legitimacy for the judicial review of 
administration action (but not for judicial exercise of executive or administrative 
authority), whilst the latter provides the broad conceptual framework within which 
the executive and public administration must do its work, and be assessed on 
review”.57 
 
“When the Constitution requires administrative action to be justifiable in relation to 
the reasons given for it, it thus seeks to give expression to the fundamental values 
of accountability, responsiveness and openness. It does not purport to give courts 
the power to perform the administrative function themselves, which would be the 
effect if justifiability in the review process is equated to justness or correctness.”58 
 
The LAC evidently accepted that, in determining whether administrative action is 
justifiable in terms of the reasons given for it, value judgments will have to be made, 
resulting in the consideration of the merits of the matter.59  Nevertheless, the court 
expounded the fact that such value judgment will only be in order, if the judge 
determining the issue, merely considers the merits of the case to determine whether 
the outcome of such administrative action is “rationally justifiable”, and not substitute 
such order with his/her own opinion.60  
 
In a similar view, O’Regan J, in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism61 emphasised that the distinction between appeals and reviews 
remains important: 
 
“Although the review functions of the court now have a substantive as well as a 
procedural ingredient, the distinction between appeals and reviews continues to be 
significant. The court should take care not to usurp the functions of administrative 
agencies. Its task is to ensure that the decisions taken by administrative agencies 
fall within the bounds of reasonableness as required by the Constitution.”62 
 
                                                          
57  Carephone v Marcus par 34. 
58  Carephone v Marcus par 35. 
59  Carephone v Marcus par 36. 
60  Ibid. 
61  2004 (4) SA 490 (CC). 
62  Bato Star Fishing v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism par 45. 
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In considering the above mentioned substantive rationale required of administrative 
decision-makers, Froneman DJP, in Carephone considered certain formulations, 
enabling such aptitude. 63   The honourable judge, however, redefined such 
formulations, based on the concept of justifiability and formulated the subsequent test: 
“is there a rational objective basis justifying the connection made by the 
administrative decision maker between the material properly available to him and 
the conclusion he or she eventually arrived at?”64  
 
2.4. CONCLUSION 
 
The test emphasised in Carephone thus forms the basis for the Sidumo contour and 
expected difficulty in formulating same.  The substantiation of the arbitrators own 
opinion on the correctness of the outcome and decisions not falling within the bounds 
of reasonableness remains a concern and the vocal point of the Sidumo contour and 
the dominant feature in the distinction between appeal and review.    
 
The strict nature of the distinction between appeal and review embed in section 145 of 
the LRA, remains the ultimate barricade and subsequent guard in the prevention of the 
disturbance of such distinction.  However, as will be noted in the Sidumo contour 
established in the subsequent chapter, the so-called infusion of the concept of 
reasonableness, with origins in Carephone, does not bring a complete finality to the 
correct approach for the review of CCMA-arbitration awards.  The Sidumo contour may 
have positioned a firm platform with the outcome-based review test,65 however it is 
contemporary Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court judgments which bring to a close 
the Sidumo contour. 
 
As mentioned above, Sidumo remains the foundation and starting point in the 
development of the review of arbitration awards and the decisive prevention of the 
consideration of the merits by the Labour Courts of such awards.  The establishment 
                                                          
63  Many formulations have been suggested for this kind of substantive rationality required of 
administrative decision-makers, such as “reasonableness”, “rationality”, “proportionality” and the 
like (Cf. e.g. Craig, Administrative Law, above, at 337349; Schwarze, European Administrative 
Law, 1992 at 677). sic Carephone v Marcus par 37. 
64  Carephone v Marcus par 37. 
65  Van Tonder Labour Court Practice (2014) 300. 
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and subsequent advance of the Sidumo test as well as the Labour Court’s application 
of the notion of reasonableness are to be considered. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT JUDGMENT – SIDUMO 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The judgment of Sidumo is without a doubt the prominent source concerning the 
application of review proceedings by our Labour Courts.  Various jurisprudential 
conclusions were made by both majority and minority judgments, introducing various 
notions into our law.  One of such concepts, partly developed by the Carephone 
judgment, is the standard of review which ought to be applied by our Labour Courts.  
In essence, Sidumo continued where Carephone left off and with great command 
introduced the new approach to be followed.   
 
After a brief reflection on the background of the Sidumo saga, this chapter advances 
and considers the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal, where the SCA disagreed 
with the approach adopted by Labour Appeal Court in treating the mine`s challenge to 
the decision as an appeal.66  Cameron JA, referred to the distinction between appeal 
and review,67 and expressed that one should not lose sight of the fact that the line 
between review and appeal is difficult to draw, “as process-related reviews can never 
blind themselves to the substantive merits of the outcome and will predominantly 
involve the consideration of substantial merits”, as concluded in Carephone.68  The 
SCA, in endorsing the fact that CCMA commissioners are subject to Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act,69 (PAJA) conceded that under PAJA there will always be a 
consideration of the merits, as the commissioner must scrutinize the connection 
                                                          
66  Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd v CCMA (2006) 27 ILJ 2076 (SCA) par 30: it asked whether 
considerations existed, which the commissioner had taken into account, that were “capable of 
sustaining” his finding. In effect, the LAC asked whether there was material on record that could 
support the view that, despite his errors, the commissioner had nevertheless “got it right”. 
67  Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd v CCMA par 30 – 31: with an appeal, the inquiry is whether the 
record contains material showing that the decision – notwithstanding any errors of reasoning – 
was correct. This is because in an appeal, the only determination is whether the decision is right 
or wrong. In a review, the question is not whether the decision is capable of being justified (or, as 
the LAC thought, whether it is not so incorrect as to make intervention doubtful), but whether the 
decision-maker properly exercised the powers entrusted to him or her. The focus is on the 
process, and on the way in which the decision-maker came to the challenged conclusion. 
68  Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd v CCMA par 30 – 31. 
69  3 of 2000. 
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between the decision and the reason given for it by the decision-maker and 
consequently determine the rationality of such decision.70  
 
The majority in the Constitutional Court judgment of Sidumo, however had contrasting 
views.  The remainder of this chapter progressed to the analysis of such judgment and, 
in particular considers the notion of the infusion of the concept of reasonableness into 
section 145 of the LRA.  The comprehensive judgment of Navsa J, indicates the 
refutation of the majority to entertain the conception of the SCA regarding PAJA, and 
subsequently formulated the standard of review, based on the abovementioned 
infusion of reasonableness into section 145.  
 
However, according to the minority, such standard of review appends an additional 
ground for review.  Ngcobo J, emphasised that this approach tends to blur the line 
between an appeal and a review, as the requirement of rationality in the merit or 
outcome of the administrative decision, goes beyond mere procedural impropriety as 
a ground for review, or irrationality only as evidence of procedural impropriety.71  
 
The majority judgment is the prevailing and ultimate guide, establishing a resolute 
standard of review, but in the development deteriorating the strict nature of such review 
process. 
 
3.2. BACKGROUND AND BRIEF OVERVIEW 
 
The first applicant, Mr Z Sidumo, a long-standing employee and part of the security 
personnel of Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd, was stationed at the Rustenburg facility 
on 20 January 2000.  This high-security facility near Rustenburg, where Mr Sidumo 
was responsible for access control, provided benefaction services, separating high-
grade precious metals such as platinum, rhodium and gold from lower-grade 
concentrate. 
 
                                                          
70  Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd v CCMA par 31. 
71  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd [2007] 12 BLLR 1097 (CC) par 242. 
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Owing to the extremely valuable nature of these metals and increasing losses due to 
theft, rigorous and meticulous search procedures formed part of the overall effort to 
protect these metals.   
 
Subsequently, Mr Sidumo failed to apply these established and detailed individual 
search procedures and was subjected to an internal disciplinary hearing, where he was 
found guilty and after an internal appeal, was dismissed for negligently failing to apply 
these search procedures.  Mr Sidumo contested this dismissal, as he had a clean 
disciplinary record leading up to the dismissal and consequently referred an unfair-
dismissal dispute to the CCMA in terms of section 191(1)(a) of the LRA.72 
 
At the CCMA, the conciliation failed and Mr Sidumo, in terms of section 191(5)(a) of 
the LRA, successfully challenged his dismissal under the compulsory arbitration 
provisions of the LRA.  The Commissioner found that there was enough basis to 
establish misconduct, but held that a dismissal was not an appropriate or fair sanction 
in the circumstances, as Sidumo had 14 years’ service and a clean disciplinary record.  
Mr Sidumo was therefore reinstated, with three months’ compensation, subject to a 
final written warning.  
 
The mine, in terms of section 145 of the LRA, applied to the Labour Court to review 
and set aside the Commissioner’s award.  The subsequent interpretation and 
application of section 145 of the LRA formed part of highly contested arguments by 
both counsels concerned, and formulated one of the key eventual findings of this case.  
The Labour Court held that the award did not contain any reviewable irregularity and 
dismissed the application with costs.  
 
This decision by the Labour Court prompted Rustenburg Platinum Mine to lodge an 
review application to the Labour Appeal Court.  The Appeal Court confirmed that the 
sanction of dismissal was too harsh and the decision of the commissioner was thus 
held to be justified.  The Labour Appeal Court dismissed the Mine’s appeal with costs.  
 
                                                          
72  66 of 1995. 
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Rustenburg Platinum Mine, undeterred, did not accept the outcome and appealed to 
the Supreme Court of Appeal.  The Supreme Court of Appeal found that the dismissal 
of Mr Sidumo was fair and overturned both the decisions of the Labour Court and the 
Labour Appeal Court.  
 
After the successful appeal, Mr Sidumo, under the auspices of COSATU73 and after a 
successful application for condonation, applied to the Constitutional Court for leave to 
appeal the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
 
3.3. SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL 
 
The SCA in Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd v CCMA,74 in exercising its new proclaimed 
status, followed a different approach to that of the LAC.  In considering the proper test 
to be applied when reviewing CCMA awards, the court revisited a lengthy debate 
generated by the abolition of the right to appeal against arbitration awards, permitted 
by the 1956 LRA and then subsequently substituted by a review process, set out in 
section 145 of the LRA on specific grounds.75  This process furthermore, in terms of 
section 158(1)(g), empowers our labour courts to review the performance of any 
function provided for in the act on specific grounds.76  This debate was deemed to be 
settled in the judgment of Carephone, where the court held that section 145 of the LRA 
was suffused to the interim constitutional standard, providing that there must be a 
rational objective basis, justifying the connection made in the outcome of administrative 
decisions in relation to the reasons given for it by the commissioners.77 However, in 
considering the proper test for review proceedings, the SCA had an opportunity to 
assert its own view on the jurisprudence.78  In this undisputed judgment of Cameron 
JA, held: 
 
“In my view, PAJA by necessary implication extended the grounds of review 
available to parties to CCMA arbitrations. In interpreting the LRA, and the impact 
                                                          
73  Congress of South African Trade Unions as second applicant. 
74  (2006) 27 ILJ 2076 (SCA). 
75  Grogan and Gauntlett “Back to the basics The SCA revisits review” 2006 Vol 28 Pt 3 Employment 
Law Journal par 16. 
76  Ibid. 
77  Grogan 2007 Employment Law Journal par 19. 
78  Ibid. 
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on it of the later enactment of PAJA, the Constitution obliges us to promote the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. This means that, without losing sight 
of the specific constitutional objectives of the LRA, and the constitutional values it 
embodies, we must in interpreting it give appropriate recognition to the right to 
administrative justice under the final Constitution and the legislation that gives 
effect to it.”79 
 
Consequently, the SCA formulated its conclusion on the basis of the Constitution80 
itself and subsequent legislation that gives effect to it.  Pertaining to the Constitution, 
one must first consider the interim-Constitution81 requirement that administrative action 
must be “justifiable in relation to the reason given for it”.  This requirement was taken 
further in Carephone, which held that this requirement ought to be encapsulated into 
section 145(2) of the LRA.82  However, the above mentioned administrative action was 
superseded upon the enactment of the PAJA, which gave effect to the constitutional 
right to lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action.  This 
constitutional setting in which the PAJA was enacted, giving effect to broad 
administrative justice, in particular with regards to the review process, supersedes the 
restricted provisions of section 145 of the LRA, even though the latter being a 
“specialised statute”.83  
 
Thus, the SCA concluded firstly, that section 6(2) of the PAJA and the subsequent 
requirement that administrative action must be justifiably connected to the reason 
given for it, is the legislative embodiment of the grounds of review to which arbitration 
parties become entitled to under the Constitution; and secondly, that awards made by 
CCMA commissioners are subject to the PAJA, in that it falls within the legislative 
framework of administrative action.84 
 
The SCA now subsequently shifted its attention to the application of the review test by 
the court a quo and ascertained whether the LAC applied these required grounds 
correctly.  Even though the LAC in Carephone was not prepared to entertain the 
broader application of a review reflected in section 158(1)(g), the SCA in Sidumo 
                                                          
79  Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd v CCMA par 23. 
80  The Constitution. 
81  200 of 1993. 
82  66 of 1995. 
83  Grogan 2007 Employment Law Journal par 19. 
84  Grogan 2007 Employment Law Journal par 23. 
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nevertheless relied to a great extent on Carephone with regards to the rational 
objective test set out by the LAC. 
 
Cameron AJ, thus referred to the test formulated in Carephone85 and concluded, based 
on the fundamental values,86  that such test: 
 
“was directly based on the wording contained in the very last part of item 23(2) of 
Schedule 6 to the Constitution
 
which was part of the wording of sections 33(1) and 
(2) of the Constitution pending the promulgation of the national legislation which, 
as it turned out, was PAJA”.87 
 
The SCA held that such approach88 taken by Carephone, compared it to administrative 
concepts such as reasonableness, rationality and proportionality,89  and confirmed 
Carephone`s conscientious advance, that the abovementioned approach could distort 
the clear distinction between appeal and review. It is for that reason that the SCA based 
its judgment and subsequent conclusion on the fact that both Carephone and PAJA 
required the court a quo90 to consider whether the commissioner’s decision to reinstate 
Mr Sidumo was:91  
 
“rationally connected to the information before him and to the reasons he gave for 
it”.92 
 
The SCA therefore concluded that the court a quo incorrectly enquired whether there 
were factors sustaining the Commissioner’s findings, thus considering the merits and 
thereby treating the matter as an appeal, rather than a review.93  The SCA concluded: 
 
“Nor does PAJA oblige us to pick and choose between the commissioner’s reasons 
to try to find sustenance for the decision despite the bad reasons. Once the bad 
                                                          
85  Froneman DJP, in Carephone thus set the test: is there a rationally objective basis justifying the 
connection made by the administrative decision-maker between the material properly available 
to him and the conclusion he or she eventually arrived at? 
86  Values of accountability, responsiveness and openness. 
87  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd par 38. 
88  Substantive rationality.  
89  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd par 39. 
90  Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd v CCMA. 
91  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd par 45. 
92  Ibid. 
93  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd par 46. 
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reasons played an appreciable or significant role in the outcome, it is, in my view, 
impossible to say that the reasons given provide a rational connection to it.”94 
 
3.4. CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
3.4.1 MAJORITY JUDGMENT 
 
Navsa AJ, initially proceeded with a lengthy assessment of the SCA judgment and 
concurred with the court a quo that the CCMA commissioner’s exercise was 
administrative action in conducting arbitration proceedings within the ambit of the 
LRA.95  However, the Constitutional Court questioned whether the review provisions 
of PAJA are automatically applicable in the present context.96  In order to establish 
whether PAJA applied, the honourable judge considered both the LRA and PAJA, in 
particular the legislature’s intention and consequently found that the LRA was 
purposefully enacted to provide an exclusive dispute-resolution basis for labour 
matters, otherwise known as the Labour Court.97  It was thus concluded by Navsa AJ, 
that the SCA had erred in finding that PAJA applied arbitration awards in terms of the 
LRA.98 
 
The Constitutional Court subsequently proceeded and addressed the essential issue 
of the standard of review. 
 
The standard of review 
The Constitutional Court in essence formulated the standard of review, by 
amalgamating previous standards set by the courts, with the fundamental notion of 
reasonableness extracted from legislation regulating administrative action.99  
 
Navsa AJ, contended firstly that, because the provisions of the LRA must be 
interpreted in compliance with the Constitution,100 the court is thus obliged to interpret 
                                                          
94  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd par 48. 
95  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd par 94. 
96  Ibid. 
97  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd par 80. 
98  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd par 104. 
99  The Constitutional Court found that review constituted administrative action. 
100  S 3 of the LRA provides that any person applying this Act must interpret its provisions- 
 (a)  to give effect to its primary objects;  
 (b)  in compliance with the Constitution; and  
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section 145 of the LRA in a manner that confirms that administrative action by the 
CCMA is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.101  The court secondly, reverted to 
the Carephone judgment, where the LAC held that section 145 of the LRA was 
suffused to the interim constitutional standard, providing that there must be a rational 
objective basis, justifying the connection made in the outcome of administrative 
decisions in relation to the reasons given for it by the commissioners.  Navsa AJ, thus 
relied on the equivalent constitutional standard in the final Constitution 102  and 
concluded that such reasonableness standard,103 dealt with in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) 
Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs,104  should now suffuse section 145 of the 
LRA.105  The learned Judge in Bato Star acknowledged the fact that reasonableness 
brings about a substantive component, resulting in the consideration of the merits, in 
a vast number of such review proceedings.  Yet it was emphasised that the distinction 
between appeals and reviews remains significant.106  
 
Navsa AJ, consequently referred to Professor Hoexter’s explanation on review for 
reasonableness, where it is argued that such review does threaten the distinction 
between appeal and review:107  
 
“The Labour Court in reviewing the awards of commissioners inevitably deals with 
the merits of the matter. This does tend to blur the distinction between appeal and 
review. She points out that it does so in the limited sense that it necessarily entails 
scrutiny of the merits of administrative decisions. She states that the danger lies, 
not in careful scrutiny, but in ‘judicial overzealousness in setting aside 
administrative decisions that do not coincide with the judge’s own opinions’. This 
Court in Bato Star recognised that danger. A judge’s task is to ensure that the 
                                                          
 (c)  in compliance with the public international-law obligations of the Republic. 
101  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd par 105. 
102  S 33 of the Constitution provides that “everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair”. 
103  In determining the proper meaning of s 6(2)(h) of PAJA in the light of the overall constitutional 
obligation upon administrative decision-makers to act “reasonably”, the approach of Lord Cooke 
provides sound guidance. Even if it may be thought that the language of s 6(2)(h), if taken literally, 
might set a standard such that a decision would rarely if ever be found unreasonable, that is not 
the proper constitutional meaning which should be attached to the subsection. The subsection 
must be construed consistently with the Constitution and in particular s 33 which requires 
administrative action to be “reasonable”. Section 6(2)(h) should then be understood to require a 
simple test, namely that an administrative decision will be reviewable if, in Lord Cooke’s words, it 
is one that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach. par 44. 
104  2004 (4) SA 490 (CC); 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC).   
105  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd par 106. 
106  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd par 108. 
107  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd par 109. 
22 
decisions taken by administrative agencies fall within the bounds of 
reasonableness as required by the Constitution.”108 
   
Professor Hoexter formulated and based such assertion on the Bato Star judgment, 
where O’Regan J, referred to the test set out by Lord Cooke in R v Chief Constable of 
Sussex,109 where Lord Cooke regretted the fact that the Wednesbury formula110 had 
been established in the UK courts and relied upon a more simple test of: 
 
“whether the decision in question was one which a reasonable authority could 
reach”.111  
 
It is thus the abovementioned view and dictum that was cited in Bato Star Fishing, 
confirming the confusing nature of the Wednesbury test and that the approach of Lord 
Cooke provides proper sound guidance: 
 
“In determining the proper meaning of section 6(2)(h) of PAJA in the light of the 
overall constitutional obligation upon administrative decision-makers to act 
reasonably.”112 
 
“Section 6(2)(h) should then be understood to require a simple test, namely, that 
an administrative decision will be reviewable if, in Lord Cooke’s words, it is one 
that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach.”113 
 
Sidumo thus encapsulated this approach and in summation held that the preferred 
approach114  is that section 145 is now suffused by the constitutional standard of 
                                                          
108  Ibid. 
109  Regina v Chief Constable of Sussex; ex parte international trader's ferry limited House of Lords 
[1998] AII ER (D) 568.  
110  See Donnelly, Hare, Jowell, Le Sueur and Woolf De Smith`s Judicial Review 7th ed (2013) 551: 
the so-called “Wednesbury reasonableness test” is where Lord Greene, M.R. stated that the 
courts can only interfere if a decision “is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever 
come to it”.  Although vague and confusing, this formulation endeavoured to point out that judges 
should not lightly interfere with the decisions of officials. In exercising their powers of review, the 
judges ought not place themselves in the position of the competent authority and test such 
decision in accordance with their own sense of reasonableness. In doing this, the court will 
engage in considering the merits of the decision. Thus, according to Lord Greene in Wednesbury, 
unreasonableness under his definition would require something overwhelming. There has 
subsequently been various attempts to reformulate the Wednesbury test, however, such 
reformulation amounts to no more than a helpful guide to the parameters.  
111  Donnelly et al De Smith`s Judicial Review 551. 
112  Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism par 44. 
113  Ibid. 
114  Froneman DJP in Carephone held that s 145 of the LRA was suffused by the then constitutional 
standard that the outcome of an administrative decision should be justifiable in relation to the 
reasons given for it Sidumo par 110. 
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reasonableness, as explained in Bato Star.115  Navsa AJ, consequently confirmed such 
standard: 
 
“Is the decision reached by the commissioner one that a reasonable decision-
maker could not reach?”116 
 
Navsa AJ, in addition held that the application of the standard will not only give effect 
to the constitutional right to fair practices, but also to the right to administrative action 
which is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.117   
 
3.4.2. MINORITY JUDGMENT 
 
In his minority judgment, Ngcobo J discarded the view endorsed by the majority that 
CCMA awards constitute administrative action and held that CCMA awards are subject 
only to review on the grounds set out in section 145.  The learned judge expressed his 
aversion in respect of the above in that it “bedevilled the proper approach to the 
determination of the ambit of review under section 145”.118 
 
Ngcobo J, argued that such approach construed by the majority, introduced: 
 
“a requirement of rationality in the merit or outcome of the administrative decision 
[which] goes beyond mere procedural impropriety as a ground for review, or 
irrationality only as evidence of procedural impropriety”.119
 
 
 
Subsequently, the minority emphasised that this approach tends to blur the line 
between an appeal and a review.120  The reviewing court does not determine whether 
the result is correct, but whether a gross irregularity121 occurred in the proceedings. 
                                                          
115  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd par 110. 
116  Ibid. 
117  Ibid. 
118  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd par 242. 
119  Ibid. 
120  Relying on Carephone, the Labour Appeal Court was mindful of the fact that the standard of 
review would “almost inevitably, involve the consideration of the ‘merits’”.
 
It cautioned that when 
determining justifiability, a court should bear in mind that it is considering the merits, “not in order 
to substitute [its] own opinion on the correctness [of the merits], but to determine whether the 
outcome is rationally justifiable”. The Labour Appeal Court was indeed at pains to emphasise that 
“it would be wrong to read into [section 33 of the Constitution] an attempt to abolish the distinction 
between review and appeal”. 
121  Infra ft 71. 
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The minority recognised that it may be difficult to draw the line, but held that there 
exists a clear line and such line must be maintained.122  Consequently, Ngcobo J, 
articulated that the proper approach in determining whether to interfere with a 
commissioners award, is whether:  
 
“the conduct of the commissioner falls into any of the grounds of review set forth 
in section 145(2) of the LRA, namely, misconduct in relation to his or her duties, 
gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings, or acting in excess 
of his or her powers. These grounds of review must be interpreted in the light of 
the constitutional constraints referred to above and the primary objective of the 
LRA. This is the interpretive injunction contained both in section 39(2) of the 
Constitution
 
and in the LRA”.123 
 
The learned judge therefore emphasized that the commissioner is required to act fairly 
in the determination of unfair dismissal disputes.124  The parties must be afforded a fair 
trial125 and have the right to have their cases fully and fairly determined.126  The minority 
explicated that fairness in the determination of an unfair dismissal disputes, requires 
the commissioner to apply his/her mind to the issues that are material to the 
determination of the dispute.127  Ngcobo J, continued and held that one of the duties128 
of a commissioner in the determination of an unfair dismissal dispute is to determine 
such material facts and consequently apply the provisions of the LRA to those facts in 
establishing whether or not the dismissal was fair.129  Thus, if a commissioner fails to 
apply his/her mind to a matter which is material to the determination of such fairness, 
                                                          
122  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd par 244. 
123  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd par 164. 
124  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd par 165. 
125  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd par 266: The requirement of fairness in the conduct of 
arbitration proceedings is consistent with the LRA and the Constitution. First, a CCMA 
commissioner is required by s 138(1) of the LRA “to determine the dispute fairly and quickly”.
 
Second, in terms of s 34 of the Constitution, everyone has the right to have any dispute that can 
be resolved by the application of the law decided in a fair public hearing before a court of law or 
an independent and impartial tribunal. The CCMA and Labour Courts were established to resolve 
labour disputes. CCMA arbitrations provide independent and impartial tribunals contemplated in 
s 34 of the Constitution.
 
The right to a fair hearing before a tribunal lies at the heart of the rule of 
law. And a fair hearing before a tribunal is a prerequisite for an order against an individual, and 
this is fundamental to a just and credible legal order.
 
A tribunal like the CCMA is obliged to ensure 
that the proceedings before it are always fair. And finally, s 23 of the Constitution guarantees to 
everyone the right to fair labour practices.  
126  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd par 267. 
127  Ibid. 
128  Supra – ft 65. 
129  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd par 267. 
25 
it will be a deficient trial, based on the lack of fairness130 and subsequently commits a 
gross irregularity131 in the conducting of the arbitration proceedings, resulting in the 
ensuing arbitral award to be reviewed and set aside.132    
 
Ngcobo’s “gross-irregularity” dictum   
The minority judgment in exploring the meaning133 of “gross irregularity” considered 
the correct interpretation, based on constitutional provisions.  Ngcobo J, inferred that 
because the commissioner performs a public function and exercises public power, 
such commissioner is thus subject to constitutional provisions in the exercise of such 
public power.134  Therefore, the learned judge interpreted “gross irregularity” in the 
context of the right to fair labour practices set out in section 23 of the Constitution as 
well as the objectives and obligations under the LRA.135  Ngcobo J, in considering the 
meaning of “gross irregularity”, referred to Goldfields and observed the distinction 
made by Schreiner J, relating to the two potential types of gross irregularity in 
arbitration proceedings. 136   The learned judge in Goldfields, firstly distinguished 
between patent irregularities, which concerns procedural irregularities that take place 
overtly in the conducting of arbitration proceedings and secondly, latent irregularities, 
which relates to errors committed in the manner the decision-maker applied his/her 
mind.137  According to Grogan138 “the rationale for incorporating latent irregularities in 
the review grounds is that both forms of irregularity undermine the very objective of 
arbitration – to afford both parties ‘a fair trial’ on the issues”. 
 
Therefore, through the consideration of the correct interpretation and subsequent 
meaning of the review grounds in section145(2)(a),139 the minority, in referring to 
constitutional and statutory provisions held that arbitration proceedings should be 
                                                          
130  Ibid. 
131  Infra – ft 77  
132  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd par 165. 
133  Based on s 33 of the Arbitration Act.  
134  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd par 260. 
135  Ibid. 
136  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd par 264. 
137  See Grogan`s comments in Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution (2013) 290 – 294.  
138  Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution.  
139  A defect referred to in ss (1), means- (a) that the commissioner - (ii) committed a gross irregularity 
in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings. 
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conducted in a fair manner and parties afforded a fair trial. Ngcobo J, therefore 
concluded and found that: 
 
“Fairness in the conduct of the proceedings requires a commissioner to apply his 
or her mind to the issues that are material to the determination of the dispute. One 
of the duties of a commissioner in conducting an arbitration is to determine the 
material facts and then to apply the provisions of the LRA to those facts in 
answering the question whether the dismissal was for a fair reason. In my judgment 
where a commissioner fails to apply his or her mind to a matter which is material 
to the determination of the fairness of the sanction, it can hardly be said that there 
was a fair trial of issues.”140 
... 
“It follows therefore that where a commissioner fails to have regard to material 
facts, the arbitration proceedings cannot in principle be said to be fair because the 
commissioner fails to perform his or her mandate. In so doing, in the words of Ellis, 
the commissioner’s action prevents the aggrieved party from having its case fully 
and fairly determined.
 
This constitutes a gross irregularity in the conduct of the 
arbitration proceedings as contemplated in section 145(2)(a)(ii) of the LRA. And 
the ensuing award falls to be set aside not because the result is wrong but because 
the commissioner has committed a gross irregularity in the conduct of the 
arbitration proceedings.”141 
 
Ngcobo’s gross-irregularity dictum, in essence, relates to whether the commissioner 
failed to have regard to material facts, resulting in the arbitration proceedings not being 
fair, because the commissioner failed to have regard to material facts. 
   
3.5. CONCLUSION  
 
The standard of review set out by the majority in Sidumo is based on the notion of 
reasonableness.  Accordingly, a court determining such reasonableness of a decision, 
must ensure that the decision falls within the bounds of reasonableness as required by 
the Constitution.  In doing so, the court delegated to determine such matter, should 
enquire whether the decision is one that a reasonable decision-maker could not have 
reached.  In exercising the above mentioned and consequently assessing the 
reasonableness of the award or decision, the court may well find that it would have 
arrived at a different decision to that reached by the commissioner.142  Consequently, 
this creates a difficulty and the courts should thus constantly remind themselves that 
                                                          
140  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd par 267. 
141  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd par 268. 
142  Fidelity Cash Management Service v CCMA [2008] 3 BLLR 197 (LAC) par 98. 
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the task in determining the fairness of the decision does not rest with the court, but 
with the commissioner.  Save for legitimate scrutiny, such interference will undermine 
the review process.143  According to Zondo JP, in Fidelity Cash Management Service 
v CCMA, Sidumo attempts to attain an uneasy balance between two extremes, 
interfering too easily on the one hand, and refraining from interfering on the other.144  
In essence Sidumo adopted a balanced approach, indicative of the fact that the core 
of such approach is the notion of reasonableness, which is construed on the 
constitutional requirement that administrative action must be lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair.  Even though the test set out by Sidumo is a stringent one, that will 
ensure that awards are not lightly interfered with,145 the concern remains that awards 
may still be easily interfered with, breaching the proverbial line between appeal and 
reviews.  The Sidumo judgment as a whole might have entrenched qualified 
jurisprudential principles.  However, this balanced approach adopted by Sidumo in the 
determination of the standard of review, is open-ended and in the author’s opinion, 
failed to protect the strict nature of the review grounds, as intended by legislature.  
 
Consequently, this created a flurry of judgments in the aftermath of Sidumo, resulting 
in dissimilar views and the further pursuit to develop the standard of review.  The 
uncertain period in the contour of the Sidumo saga was initially based on the three 
judgments of Gaga,146 Afrox Healthcare147 and Herholdt,148 where the Labour Appeal 
Court sought to clarify the approach adopted by Sidumo and to develop the review test 
further.149   The foundation of such development is the view that awards can be 
reviewed both on the grounds listed in section 145 of the LRA and the ground of 
unreasonableness, and furthermore, that there are two broad types of reviews: result-
based reviews and process-related reviews.150  Such development is thus limited to 
reviews based on a latent gross irregularity and unreasonableness.  However, there 
                                                          
143  Ibid. 
144  Fidelity Cash Management Service v CCMA par 99.  
145  Fidelity Cash Management Service v CCMA par 100.  
146  Gaga v Anglo Platinum Ltd (2012) 33 ILJ 329 (LAC). 
147  Afrox Healthcare Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration (2012) 33 ILJ 1381 
(LAC).  
148  Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd (2012) 23 ILJ 1789 (LAC). 
149  Myburgh “The LAC’s latest trilogy of review judgments: Is the Sidumo test in Decline?” 2013 34 
ILJ 19 19. 
150  Myburgh 2013 ILJ 27. 
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would be a final pronouncement in the shadow of the three LAC judgments, and in 
order to analyse the most recent assertion, it is thus imperative to consider such 
trilogy.151   
                                                          
151  Myburgh 2013 ILJ 1. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE LAC JUDGMENTS – THE TRILOGY 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The majority in the Constitutional Court judgments of Sidumo established a stringent 
test for review, curtailing to a certain extent the interference by Labour Court judges   
in the awards of commissioners.  It would be expected that subsequent judgments 
would continue in the pursuit of the further development of the so-called Sidumo test.  
However, the jurisprudence that followed the Sidumo judgment was by all means  
contentious, since the fundamental starting point of each of the Labour Appeal Court 
judgments, was the minority judgment in Sidumo, Ngcobo’s gross-irregularity dictum.  
Besides the endorsement of such minority view, one judgment in particular, went as 
far as to conclude that an award can be set aside, without establishing the Sidumo 
test.  Consequently, this departure from the Sidumo contour and broader view, resulted 
in the further relaxation of the distinction between appeals and reviews. 
 
In considering the above mentioned litigious judgments, I shall set out the focal dictum 
of each and subsequently analyse such pronouncement in relation to the development 
of the Sidumo test. In order to appreciate the nature of the terms referred to by the 
various judgments and to avoid unnecessary reiteration, a summation by Myburgh,152 
setting out a range of meanings and descriptions are relied upon.153 
 
4.2. GAGA v ANGLO PLATINUM LTD154 
                                                          
152  Myburgh “The test for review of CCMA arbitration awards: an update” 2013 23 Contemporary 
Labour Law 31-32. 
153  Myburgh 2013 Contemporary Labour Law 31-32: “‘Section 145’ or ‘the grounds listed in s 145’: 
the reviewable defects of misconduct, gross irregularity and excess of powers listed in s 145(2) of 
the LRA, ‘Latent irregularity’: an irregularity which occurs in the mind of a commissioner at the 
time of writing his or her award and appears from it – for example, that material facts were ignored. 
It equates to an act of dialectical unreasonableness. ‘Patent irregularity’: an irregularity which 
occurs during the course of the arbitration proceedings and which constitutes a breach of the rules 
of procedural fairness. ‘Substantive unreasonableness’: an unreasonable result. ‘Dialectical 
unreasonableness’: an unreasonable process failure (in the cognitive sense) involving, for 
example, the failure by a commissioner to consider material facts. ‘Process-related review’: a 
review application based on an attack on a commissioner’s reasoning and findings of fact, which 
typically highlights the failure to consider material facts and errors of fact.” 
154  (2012) 33 ILJ 329 (LAC). 
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The LAC was tasked to establish whether there was a rational basis justifying the 
commissioner’s conclusion that there was no sexual harassment committed by the 
group human-resources manager with his personal assistant.155  The said employee 
appealed to the LAC, after the employer successfully reviewed the commissioner’s 
award.  The LAC thus had to ascertain whether the commissioner ignored the material 
facts and considerations and subsequently failed to apply his mind accurately to such 
material evidence.156  Murphy AJA held as follows: 
 
“Where a commissioner fails properly to apply his mind to material facts and unduly 
narrows the inquiry by incorrectly construing the scope of an applicable rule, he 
will not fully and fairly determine the case before him. The ensuing decision 
inevitably will be tainted by dialectical unreasonableness (process-related 
unreasonableness), characteristically resulting in a lack of rational connection 
between the decision and the evidence and most likely an unreasonable outcome 
(substantive unreasonableness). There will often be an overlap between the 
ground of review based on a failure to take into consideration a relevant factor and 
one based on the unreasonableness of a decision. If a commissioner does not take 
into account a factor that he is bound to take into account, his or her decision 
invariably will be unreasonable. The flaw in process alone will usually be sufficient 
to set aside the award on the grounds of it being a latent gross irregularity, 
permitting a review in terms of section 145(1) read with section 145(2)(a)(ii) of the 
LRA.”157  
 
The said dictum in Gaga, is based on the pronouncement of Ngcobo J, in Sidumo.  It 
emphasises the principle that the failure by the commissioner to apply her mind to the 
material facts, prevents the party from having their matter determined on a fair basis 
and thus constitutes a latent irregularity, justifying the setting-aside of an award.158  
Such approach in Gaga is thus confirmed by the citation of Ngcobo`s gross-irregularity 
dictum, 159  in support of the LAC’s finding. Murphy AJA, however, continued and 
                                                          
155  The CCMA award was set aside on review by the Labour Court.  
156  Gaga v Anglo Platinum Ltd par 43. 
157  Gaga v Anglo Platinum Ltd par 44. 
158  Myburgh 2013 ILJ 21. 
159  Murphy AJA in Gaga v Anglo Platinum Ltd par 44; set out that, in the minority judgment in Sidumo 
Ngcobo J, (as he then was) in effect distinguished review on grounds of dialectical 
unreasonableness from substantive unreasonableness, when he observed: “It follows therefore 
that where a commissioner fails to have regard to material facts, the arbitration proceedings 
cannot in principle be said to be fair because the commissioner fails to perform his or her mandate. 
In so doing the commissioner’s action prevents the aggrieved party from having its case fully and 
fairly determined. This constitutes a gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration, as 
contemplated in section 145(2)(a)(ii) of the LRA. And the ensuing award falls to be set aside not 
because the result is wrong but because the commissioner has committed a gross irregularity in 
the conduct of the arbitration proceedings.”  
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expounded the two forms of unreasonableness, 160  by referring to dialectical 
unreasonableness, which constitutes an unreasonable process failure, occurring in the 
mind of the commissioner and substantive unreasonableness comprising of an 
unreasonable result.161  The learned judge contended that an unreasonable-process 
failure, for example, the failure by a commissioner to consider the material facts, will 
recurrently amount in an unreasonable result.  Thus concluding that dialectical 
unreasonableness and substantive unreasonableness will often overlap, however, the 
unreasonable-process failure itself will be sufficient to sustain a review.162 
 
As a result, the LAC concluded that the commissioner`s irregularity in excluding 
similar-fact evidence is sufficient to uphold the review,163 in that such absence of 
similar-fact evidence has a bearing on the determination of a appropriate sanction in 
this case164 and a failure to have regard to same, hamper a full and fair determination 
of the issues.165   
 
4.3. AFROX HEALTHCARE LTD v COMMISSION FOR CONCILIATION, 
MEDIATION & ARBITRATION166 
 
The issue to be determined by the LAC, was whether the reasonableness of the 
commissioner’s award, in which it was found that the appellant had led no evidence to 
substantiate the charges tendered against the employee, based on alleged negligence, 
in that the employee failed to supervise untrained nursing staff, resulting in the death 
of a patient.  This failure to present such evidence consequently resulted in the 
conclusion by the commissioner that there was no negligence on the part of the 
employee.167  Mlambo JP, held as follows: 
 
“The fact of the matter is that the reasonable decision maker yardstick crafted in 
Sidumo, viewed in proper context, is none other than that in the absence of a 
“rational objective basis” between the decision arrived at and the material placed 
                                                          
160  Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd v CCMA [2009] 11 BLLR 1129 (LC) par 14-17. 
161  Myburgh 2013 Contemporary Labour Law 32. 
162  Myburgh 2013 ILJ 20. 
163  Gaga v Anglo Platinum Ltd par 46. 
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before the decision maker, the relevant decision is clearly not one which a 
reasonable decision maker would have arrived at.”168  
 
The LAC in Afrox Healthcare thus found that the above mentioned reasonable 
decision-maker yardstick as per Sidumo is equivalent to the absence of a “rational 
objective basis” between the decision arrived at and the material facts before such 
decision-maker; thus in essence relying on Ngcobo J’s gross-irregularity dictum.169     
 
In drawing the above dictum, the LAC assessed the commissioner’s reasoning in 
relation to the material placed before him and subsequently established such failure, 
where there is an absence of a rational objective basis between them. 170   In 
considering the consequences of such failure, the LAC in Afrox Healthcare accordingly 
centred its finding firstly, on the distinction between two types of reviews, the first of 
which where the commissioner failed to consider all the material evidence and 
secondly, how the commissioner treated such evidence in determining the award.171  
The former is the challenge entertained in Afrox Healthcare, inter alia, a process-
related review.172  On the pronouncement of the issues in dispute, Mlambo JP, clarified 
his view in relation to that of the commissioner, in respect of having a different analysis.  
Mlambo JP, confirmed that the LAC is not responsible for determining the fairness of 
the dismissal.173  Thus, respecting the proverbial line between appeal and review.  The 
LAC proceeded and thus argued that such view entertained by the said court, is based 
on the holistic analysis of the evidence, which the commissioner in arriving at his 
decision, did not take into consideration.174 Thus, failing to consider the material placed 
                                                          
168  Afrox Healthcare v CCMA par 21. 
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170  Myburgh 2013 ILJ 22. 
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172  Ibid. 
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before him, in particular certain critical considerations,175 leading him to arrive at an 
unreasonable result.176  
 
Mlambo JP, relied a great deal on Ngcobo and the dictum177 in Another v New Clicks 
South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others,178 in concluding that the commissioner failed the 
Sidumo test, in that the said commissioner failed to apply his mind to the material 
evidence, which had a bearing on the ultimate conclusion, resulting in the award being 
unreasonable.179 
 
4.4. HERHOLDT v NEDBANK LTD180 
 
The primary judgment of the three and subsequent derivation of the contemporary 
conclusion by the SCA, concerned a probe into whether the commissioner committed 
a reviewable defect, by ruling that the employee, a financial planner, did not act with 
dishonest intent, when he failed to disclose to his employer that he was a beneficiary 
in a dying client’s will, as per Nedbank’s conflict-of-interest policy.181  The appeal was 
set aside by the LAC, upholding the judgment of the Labour Court, that the dismissal 
was substantially fair. Murphy AJA, pronounced:  
 
“One of the duties of a commissioner is to determine the material facts and then to 
apply the provisions of the LRA to those facts in answering the question whether 
the dismissal was for a fair reason. Commissioners who do not do so do not fairly 
adjudicate the issues and the resulting decision and award will be unreasonable. 
Whether or not an arbitration award or decision or finding of a commissioner is 
                                                          
175  Ibid.  
176  Mlambo JP, in Afrox Healthcare v CCMA 19: In considering the abovementioned lapse by the 
commissioner, Mlambo JP, referred to the judgment of National Union of Mine Workers v 
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into account a factor that he or she is bound to take into consideration, the resulting decision can 
hardly be said to be that of a reasonable decision maker.” 
178  2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at par 511. 
179  Myburgh 2013 ILJ 23. 
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reasonable must be determined objectively with due regard to all the evidence that 
was before him or her and what the issues were. There is no requirement that the 
commissioner must have deprived the aggrieved party of a fair trial by 
misconceiving the whole nature of enquiry. The threshold for interference is lower 
than that, it being sufficient that the commissioner has failed to apply his mind to 
certain of the material facts or issues before him, with such having potential for 
prejudice and the possibility that the result may have been different. This standard 
recognises that dialectical and substantive reasonableness are intrinsically inter-
linked and that latent process irregularities carry the inherent risk of causing an 
unreasonable substantive outcome.”182 
 
In the analysis of the abovementioned dictum, several key legal actualities can be 
drawn in respect of the test for review, the standard of review and impact on Sidumo.  
The dictum is based on the premise that one of the duties of a commissioner is to 
consider the material facts before him/her and then subsequently applying his/her mind 
in establishing the fairness of the dismissal. 
 
Thus, at the outset, a failure by a commissioner to consider the material facts, will result 
in the unfair adjudication of the dispute and the award thus being unreasonable.183  
Such unreasonableness relates to the failure by the commissioner to determine the 
material facts, resulting in the unfairness of the award.184  Thus, such failure, could 
either constitute a gross irregularity as per Ngcobo J’s gross irregularity dictum or 
dialectical unreasonableness, demonstrating an unreasonable-process failure, as a 
result of failure by commissioner to consider material facts.185  Therefore, such failure 
to consider the material facts, results in either a gross irregularity or an unreasonable-
process failure, resulting in the award being unreasonable.  
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Secondly, Murphy AJA, expounded on such substantive unreasonableness of the 
award,186 referred to as “Sidumo test”,187 and held that the notion of reasonableness is 
determined objectively, in the consideration of all the evidence that was before the 
commissioner and does not require that such failure by the commissioner amounts to 
the misconceiving of the whole nature of the enquiry.188  It is thus sufficient that the 
commissioner only had to misconstrue certain of the material evidence before him, 
which has the potential for prejudice and possibility that the result may be different.189  
Therefore, based on the fact that dialectical unreasonableness bears the potential risk 
of causing an unreasonable-substantive outcome, the notion of both dialectical and 
substantive unreasonableness are interlinked.190   
 
It is thus evident from such interpretation, that Murphy AJA, endorsed a lighter test for 
prejudice. In order to comprehend such undemanding test to succeed on review, 
Myburgh191 explains that one of three tests for prejudice theoretically stands to be 
satisfied where a commissioner failed to apply his/her mind to the material facts.  Such 
tests for prejudice are set out on the hypothetical analysis of whether the result of the 
award:  
 
(1)  may have been different;  
(2)  would have been different; or  
(3)  is rendered unreasonable,192  
 
if the commissioner had considered the facts ignored by him/her.193      
 
                                                          
186  Myburgh 2013 Contemporary Labour Law 32; Substantive unreasonableness is encompassed in 
the test set in par 110 of the majority judgment of the Constitutional Court in Sidumo & Another v 
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187  Ibid. 
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189  Ibid. 
190  Ibid. 
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193  Myburgh 2013 Contemporary Labour Law 33. 
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Murphy AJA, accentuates in his dictum that it is sufficient that the failure by the 
commissioner to apply his/her mind to only some of the material facts before him/her, 
resulting in the potential for prejudice and the possibility that the result may be different.  
It is thus the lightest of the abovementioned tests for prejudice, and if such 
straightforward test is met, the award will be set aside on the grounds of either a gross 
irregularity or dialectical unreasonableness, without the result of the award being 
substantively unreasonable.194  An award can thus be set aside on process-related 
grounds, without establishing the Sidumo test.195      
 
In reaching such conclusion, the Labour Appeal Court subsequently endorsed the view 
of the court a quo and held that the commissioner committed a gross irregularity by 
ignoring relevant evidence and failed to apply his/her mind to a number of material 
issues.196  The LAC thus dismissed the appeal.197  
 
4.5. CONCLUSION  
 
In summation, the judgments of Gaga, Afrox Healthcare and Herholdt did not endorse 
nor develop the Sidumo test in a constructive approach.  Instead, these Labour Appeal 
Court judgments endorsed and widened the approach by the Labour courts in relation 
to the interference of arbitration awards.  The legal position established by the said 
judgments, confirmed that CCMA awards can be reviewed on section 145 grounds 
and, in addition on the basis of unreasonableness.198  Furthermore, concerning the 
types of reviews, the judgments concluded that there are two different types, that being 
patent irregularities and latent irregularities.199  In addition, it was also established that 
substantive unreasonableness and dialectical unreasonableness equate to two 
different categories of unreasonableness.200  The former, concerns the Sidumo test, 
based on the unreasonableness of the award and the latter, where a commissioner 
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fails to apply his mind to the material facts.201  Herholdt, in particular, ascertained that 
substantive unreasonableness and dialectical unreasonableness are interlinked, in 
that an unreasonable-process failure will often lead to an unreasonable result.  
Pertaining to Ngcobo’s gross-irregularity dictum, where a commissioner fails to apply 
his mind to the material facts, resulting in the unfair adjudication of the dispute and 
thus constitutes a latent irregularity, which accordingly equates to dialectical 
unreasonableness.202  
 
The concern is the effortless interference in the review of such gross irregularity or 
dialectical unreasonableness, based on the potential for prejudice-test.  This 
interference by the Labour Courts is even more simplified, as a result of the interlinking 
of substantive unreasonableness and dialectical unreasonableness.  Thus, based on 
this light test for review, a mere failure by the commissioner to consider the material 
facts, that might “potentially” cause an unreasonable substantive outcome, causes the 
award to be set aside.  Therefore, this interference of the proverbial line between 
appeals and reviews and the ensuing relaxation of such distinction result in there being 
even no need to show substantial unreasonableness, but a mere potential for prejudice 
as a result of the commissioner’s failure to consider the material facts, or the unfair 
adjudicating of the hearing itself, which is sufficient to set aside the award.  The 
direction followed by the Labour Appeal Court judgments and in particular Herholdt, 
makes it therefore easier to succeed on review than on appeal,203 which contradicts 
the objectives of the legislature, in that disputes under the LRA must be resolved 
expeditiously.204 
 
This misapplication of the Sidumo test encouraged applicants on review to rather base 
their application on a gross irregularity or dialectical unreasonableness. 205   This 
created a deviation from the Sidumo contour, resulting in the unjustifiable relaxation of 
the grounds of review, in divergence of the intention of the Legislature.  Where Sidumo 
attempted to correct such unjustifiable inclination with a more stringent test, Gaga, 
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Afrox Healthcare and Herholdt slacken such view endorsed by the Constitutional 
Court.  It was thus up to the Supreme Court of Appeal206 and a subsequent Labour 
Appeal Court judgment  to set the matter straight and recoup the more inflexible 
approach to be followed by Labour Court judges, and thus maintain the strict distinction 
between appeal and review. 
 
  
                                                          
206  COSATU intervened as amicus curiae and proceeded with the appeal. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE CONTEMPORARY JUDGMENTS OF SCA AND LAC – 
THE RESPONSE 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The SCA judgment in Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd 207 and subsequent LAC judgment in 
Gold Fields Mining SA (Pty) Ltd v CCMA208 sought to correct the broad approach 
established by the trilogy,209 in endorsing a more restricted approach, based on the 
true intention of the legislature. In essence, the judgments emphasised the true 
meaning210 set out in section 145 of the LRA concerning the review ground of gross 
irregularity, as well as the stringent nature of the Sidumo test, ensuring that awards are 
not lightly interfered with, and preserving the distinction between appeal and review.211  
 
The divergence from Sidumo purged the notion of reasonableness, resulting in the 
distortion of the proverbial fine line between appeals and reviews.  It is thus evident 
that the notion of reasonableness holds the key in process-related reviews.  Without 
the reliance thus on the sound conception of the Sidumo test, it is merely required that 
the arbitrator applied his mind to the material facts in establishing whether the dismissal 
was for a fair reason.  Such simple application formed the basis for the LAC judgment 
in Herholdt.  This misapplication of the Sidumo test encouraged applicants on review 
to rather base their application on a gross irregularity or dialectical 
unreasonableness.212 
 
Hence, the SCA in Herholdt and LAC in Gold Fields endorsed the suffusion of the 
constitutional standard of reasonableness, albeit it based on different approaches. 
Herholdt (SCA) established that awards can be reviewed both on the listed ground in 
section 145 and on the ground of unreasonableness.  Gold Fields to the contrary, held 
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that awards are only reviewable on the section 145 listed grounds, if the additional 
requirement of unreasonableness are met.213  
 
The chapter will commence with an analysis of the SCA judgment of Herholdt, in 
considering the historical view of the meaning of a gross irregularity and in addition, 
the operation of the Sidumo test.  The significant aspect of the analyses, concerns the 
rejection by the SCA of the inaccurate development of the review test by the court a 
quo.  The analysis culminates in the consideration that the SCA narrowed the scope 
for interference by Labour Court judges and in the process preserved the distinction 
between appeal and review.    
 
Gold Fields was the first judgment dealing with the review test that followed the SCA 
judgment.  Even though Gold Fields endorsed the Sidumo test and was in line with the 
development established by the SCA in Herholdt, the judgment recognised an 
excessive approach, with a more burdensome requirement to succeed on review. In 
considering that both judgments endorsed the notion of unreasonableness, the 
approach of the SCA is to be preferred,214 and it is thus futile to dabble in the analysis 
of the Gold Fields judgment.  However, the author deems it fit to consider a brief 
collective comparison of the two judgments and in the process to emphasise the 
current position in our law.  
 
5.2 HERHOLDT v NEDBANK LTD  
 
The development of the review test was at the core of this Supreme Court of Appeal 
judgment.  The particular development in question, concerned the court a quo`s 
relaxation of the grounds to challenge CCMA awards on review,215 in that the LAC 
endorsed the lightest test for prejudice,216 and concluded that if such straightforward 
test is met, the award will be set aside on the grounds of either a gross irregularity or 
dialectical unreasonableness, without the need to establish the Sidumo test, 
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consequently, encouraging applicants on review to rather base their application on a 
gross-irregularity or dialectical unreasonableness.   
 
In the analysis of the inaccurate development of the review test by the LAC, the SCA 
in Herholdt sought to reaffirm the position in our law. Such jurisprudence is 
emphatically summated and thus captured as the current position in our law. 
Honourable judges Cachalia and Wallis, in the process of scrutinising the LAC 
judgment, sought to underlie and re-establish the importance and preservation of the 
distinction between appeal and review.  
 
In concluding that the LAC had erred in its development of the review test,217 the SCA 
considered the historical view of the meaning of a gross irregularity and in addition, the 
operation of the Sidumo test.  Such considerations set the basis for the conclusion and 
the subsequent rejection of the LAC’s development of the review test. In reaching such 
conclusion, the SCA dealt with and subsequently analysed the formulation of the 
incorrect development by setting out the notions of latent irregularities and dialectical 
unreasonableness, which formed the basis of the Labour Appeal Court judgment.   
 
5.2.1 GROSS IRREGULARITY  
 
The legislature, with the intention of formulating an informal and expeditious resolution 
of disputes arising from the Labour Relations Act, selected arbitration as the dispute-
resolution mechanism and consequently mirrored section 145(2) on corresponding 
legislation218  in the Arbitration Act.219   The drafters of the LRA thus emphasised, 
through such limited grounds contained in section 145(2), the intention to deter parties 
in challenging arbitration awards and impede upon the inexpensive and expeditious 
resolution of such disputes.220  
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One of such narrow grounds contemplated in section 145(2) and which is also reflected 
in the Arbitration Act, is that of a gross irregularity.  This ground of review concerns the 
conduct of the proceedings, rather than the merits of the decision.221  
 
The SCA was thus of the view that the legislature intended  a gross irregularity, as 
reflected in section 145(2), to be based on the corresponding legislation contained in 
section 33 of the Arbitration Act, and consequently interpreted to relate to the conduct  
of the proceedings, where the commissioner misconceives the whole nature of the 
enquiry.  This high standard for setting aside an award, is thus indicative of the 
historical intention of the legislature in preventing the effortless interference of 
arbitration awards.222 
 
A further advance in challenging an award on the ground of a gross irregularity, was 
developed in the Constitutional judgment of Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines 
Ltd.223  This advance was significant, as it related to the suffusion of the constitutional 
standard of reasonableness.224  The SCA thus assessed and set out the legal position 
after Sidumo. 
 
5.2.2 THE OPERATION OF THE SIDUMO TEST 
 
The SCA clarified the operation of the Sidumo test and subsequently concluded that 
the unreasonable test set out in Sidumo concerned the holistic examination by the 
reviewing court of all the merits, and consequently assessing whether the award was 
one that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach. 225   The reasoning of the 
commissioner is to be considered, enabling the reviewing court to ascertain whether 
the result reached by such commissioner could have reasonably been reached by 
taking such route.  Thus, Cachalia JA and Wallis JA confirmed the operation of the 
Sidumo test and concluded that the legal position after Sidumo entailed that: 
 
                                                          
221  Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd par 10 – it was held that a “gross irregularity” is committed where 
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“Reviews could be brought on the unreasonableness test laid down by the 
Constitutional Court and the specific grounds set out in ss 145(2)(a) and (b) of the 
LRA. The latter had not been extinguished by the Constitutional Court but were to 
be ‘suffused’ with the constitutional standard of reasonableness. What this meant 
simply is that a ‘gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings’ as 
envisaged by s 145(2)(a)(ii) of the LRA, was not confined to a situation where the 
arbitrator misconceives the nature of the enquiry, but extended to those instances 
where the result was unreasonable in the sense explained in that case.”226 
  
The SCA accordingly concluded that commissioners commit a gross irregularity if they 
misconceive the whole nature of the enquiry or if they produce an unreasonable 
award.227  The former is based on the historical meaning of a gross irregularity and the 
latter on the Sidumo test.  
 
It might thus be interpreted that this SCA judgment both narrowed and widened the 
test for gross irregularity.228  However, with reference to Sidumo, it was emphasised 
by the SCA, that even though the reviewing court exercises the assessment and 
scrutiny of the merits,229 the court should always be conscientious in avoiding “judicial 
overzealousness in setting aside administrative decisions that do not coincide with the 
judge's own opinions”.230  Hence, the SCA referred to the judgment of Fidelity Cash 
Management Service v CCMA231 and held: 
 
“The LAC subsequently stressed that the test ‘is a stringent [one] that will ensure 
that … awards are not lightly interfered with’ and that its emphasis is on the result 
of the case rather than the reasons for arriving at that result. The Sidumo test will, 
however, justify setting aside an award on review if the decision is disconnected 
with the ‘evidence’ or is ‘unsupported by any evidence’ and involves speculation 
by the commissioner.”232 
 
To outline, the SCA endorsed the view that the Sidumo test will ensure that awards 
are not lightly interfered with, by only placing emphasis on the result of the case, thus 
assessing whether the award was one that a reasonable decision-maker could not 
reach.  It is therefore evident that the approach endorsed by the SCA is to preserve 
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the distinction between review and appeal233 and not simply set aside an award if the 
reviewing court would have reached a different conclusion. 
 
Sidumo established a sound advance in respect of the grounds of review234 and thus 
established a clear position for such test for review.235  However, such progressive 
view, which preserved the distinction between appeal and review, was distorted by 
subsequent judgments, in particular the LAC judgment in Herholdt.  Such judgments 
aimed at providing a more generous standard for the review of CCMA-arbitration 
awards.236  The SCA therefore sought to bring an end to such counter-development in 
considering and analysing the pivotal formulation set out by the LAC, under the heads 
of latent irregularity and dialectical unreasonableness. 
 
5.2.3 LATENT IRREGULARITY 
 
The SCA defined a latent irregularity237 as the failure by the arbitrator to take into 
account a material fact in determining the arbitration.238  The court also described such 
irregularity to include the converse, where the commissioner took into account a totally 
irrelevant fact.239  Should the abovementioned irregularities occur, it is perceived as a 
latent irregularity and it subsequently justifies the setting aside of the award.  
 
In considering the approach endorsed by the LAC, honourable judges Cachalia and 
Wallis analysed and considered the authority relied upon by the court a quo.  The LAC 
in Herholdt relied upon an approach established in Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) 
Ltd v CCMA.240  The basis of this approach, according to the SCA, concerns dual 
considerations.  Firstly, the threshold for interference with the award of the 
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commissioner is lower as the interference established in Sidumo241 and secondly, it is 
irrelevant whether the result reached by the commissioner is one that could have been 
reasonably reached with the material before such commissioner.  It was concluded by 
the SCA that the mere possibility of prejudice will suffice to warrant interference by the 
reviewing court.242  The premise of the abovementioned approach, is the dictum243 of 
the minority judgment of Ngcobo J, (as he then was) in Sidumo. 
 
The SCA, in analysing the minority judgment, disregarded the dictum of Ngcobo J, as 
such approach is contrary to that of the majority judgment in Sidumo.244 
 
The SCA held that such approach cannot be accepted.245  
 
Despite the rejection of Ngcobo J’s dictum, the SCA contended that a latent irregularity 
may well equate to a gross irregularity within the meaning of section 145(2)(a)(ii), but 
only in a narrower sense, “where the decision-maker has undertaken the wrong 
enquiry or undertaken the enquiry in the wrong manner”.246  
 
The SCA thus substantially limited the approach endorsed by the LAC,247 in concluding 
that the court cannot merely rely on the failure by the commissioner to apply his mind 
to the material facts, to succeed on review.248  In order to succeed on review, the 
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applicant has to establish that the result was unreasonable.249  In addition, the SCA 
reiterated that such limited application of a latent irregularity should be based on the 
historical meaning of a “gross irregularity” and subsequently read together with the 
Sidumo test, in the instance where the commissioner produces an award which fails 
the Sidumo test.250  Accordingly, the SCA adopted a considerably narrower approach 
than that of the LAC and rejected the basis for the approach set out by the court a quo.  
 
The SCA in Herholdt, however, continued and scrutinised the inaccurate development 
of the review test by the LAC, by consequently considering the other formulation set 
out by the LAC in support of such development. 
 
5.2.4 DIALECTICAL UNREASONABLENESS  
 
The SCA briefly considered the notion of dialectical unreasonableness, in defining it as 
an unreasonableness flowing from the process of reasoning adopted by the 
commissioner.  The LAC based its interpretation on whether the arguments and 
thought process of the commissioner were reasonable.251  This approach adopted by 
the LAC, was based on Ngcobo J’s dictum in the Constitutional Court judgment of New 
Clicks.252  However, the SCA found that the above mentioned dictum related to the 
provisions of PAJA and the manner in which they are to be applied 253  and thus 
concluded: 
 
“As PAJA does not apply to reviews under s 145(2) of the LRA it is of no application 
to CCMA awards. Second, if applied by considering the reasoning of a CCMA 
arbitrator and determining that the reasons given for making an award are not such 
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as to justify that award, its effect is to resuscitate this court’s decision in Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation 
and Arbitration, supra, even though that decision was expressly overruled in 
Sidumo. Once again that is not a permissible development of the law.”254 
 
Hence, the SCA held that the reliance on such passage from New Clicks, has no basis 
for the development of the review test.  
 
5.2.5 CONCLUSION  
 
In concluding its finding, the SCA summarised the current legal position as follows: 
 
“In summary, the position regarding the review of CCMA awards is this: A review 
of a CCMA award is permissible if the defect in the proceedings falls within one of 
the grounds in s 145(2)(a) of the LRA. For a defect in the conduct of the 
proceedings to amount to a gross irregularity as contemplated by s 145(2)(a)(ii), 
the arbitrator must have misconceived the nature of the inquiry or arrived at an 
unreasonable result. A result will only be unreasonable if it is one that a reasonable 
arbitrator could not reach on all the material that was before the arbitrator. Material 
errors of fact, as well as the weight and relevance to be attached to particular facts, 
are not in and of themselves sufficient for an award to be set aside, but are only of 
any consequence if their effect is to render the outcome unreasonable.”255 
 
In analysing the abovementioned summation, key jurisprudential points 256  can be 
established.  Firstly, there will be a ground for review, if a defect in the proceedings 
falls within one of the grounds of section 145(2)(a) of the LRA.  Thus, for the defect to 
equate to a gross irregularity, as contemplated in section 145(2)(a), the commissioner 
must have misconceived the nature of the enquiry or arrived at an unreasonable result. 
 
Secondly, a commissioner committing a material error of fact or failing to consider 
certain evidence, will not as such be sufficient for an award to be set aside,257 except, 
if it can be established that, because of the effect of such errors committed by the 
commissioner,258 the result of the award is rendered unreasonable.      
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The SCA in Herholdt therefore increased the test for prejudice in comparison to the 
light test set out by the LAC in Herholdt,259 and consequently narrowed the scope for 
interference and in the process preserved the distinction between appeal and review.    
 
Even though the SCA was critical about the LAC`s development of the review test, it 
nevertheless concluded that the LAC found that the result of the award failed the 
Sidumo test and consequently upheld the LAC’s judgment.260 
 
5.3 A COMPARISON OF HERHOLDT AND GOLD FIELDS  
 
The Gold Fields judgment was the first LAC judgment to follow the above mentioned 
SCA judgment, in making reference to the review test.  The appeal to the LAC was 
based on the contention that the Labour Court incorrectly dismissed261 the appellants’ 
claim that the arbitrator committed a process-related irregularity when he 
miscategorised the respondents’ conduct as poor performance and not that of 
misconduct, resulting in the arbitrator’s failure to properly apply his mind to the facts.262  
 
Taking into account that the Gold Fields’ judgment directly followed the SCA judgment 
in Herholdt, certain key legal positions can by surmised and compared. 
 
The SCA in Herholdt and LAC in Gold Fields dealt mainly with latent irregularities and 
unreasonableness, relating to factual findings made by the commissioner in 
establishing the guilt of the employee.263  Broader sources for reviews, such as lack of 
jurisdiction, errors of law and patent irregularities were not dealt with by the 
judgments.264  
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Both Herholdt and Gold Fields therefore endorsed the suffusion of the constitutional 
standard of reasonableness. Herholdt established that awards can be reviewed both 
on the listed ground in section 145 and on the ground of unreasonableness; conversely 
Gold Fields held that awards are only reviewable on the section 145 listed grounds, if 
the additional requirement of unreasonableness is met.265  
 
Furthermore, concerning reviews based on the failure by commissioners to consider 
the material facts, Herholdt and Gold Fields jointly found in essence that a review based 
on the commissioners’ failure to consider the material facts, will only be reviewable if it 
is established that such gross irregularity caused the result of the award to be 
substantively unreasonable.266  In making this finding, both the judgments rejected 
Ngcobo J’s gross-irregularity dictum and the potential-for-prejudice test set out in 
Herholdt (LAC), limiting the basis of review. 
 
In addition, the LAC in Gold Fields held that, where the commissioner fails to identify 
the dispute to be arbitrated, does not understand the nature of the dispute to be 
arbitrated or that the commissioner does not deal with the substantial merits of the 
dispute, it would, provided that the award also failed the Sidumo test, qualify as 
additional errors within a gross irregularity.267 
 
The most essential aspect, the operation of the Sidumo test, was addressed and 
confirmed by both judgments.  In maintaining the distinction between an appeal and a 
review, both judgments emphasised that the Sidumo test will only be met if the result 
of the award falls outside a notional band of reasonable decision.268  This endeavour, 
to maintain the abovementioned division, was stressed by both Herholdt and Gold 
Fields, in finding that the courts should not simply focus on the errors committed by the 
commissioner in determining whether the Sidumo test is met, but should rather engage 
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in a holistic analyses of all the material evidence in order to establish if the award is 
capable of reasonable justification.269  
 
It could well be contended that the aforementioned jurisprudence makes it more difficult 
to succeed on review, nonetheless both these judgments are rooted in Sidumo, and 
endorsed same, resulting in a development which places us back on track and 
consequently embodies the true intention of the legislature with minimal interference in 
the awards of the arbitrators.  
 
5.4 CONCLUSION  
 
The Sidumo test, based on the notion of reasonableness, set the platform for sound 
jurisprudential development, seeking to preserve the true intention of the legislature 
and maintain the differentiation between appeals and reviews.  The interference of 
commissioners’ awards was thus limited, encouraging the Labour Court judges not to 
delve into the merits of the case, but upholding the true nature of review proceedings. 
Such desired development by our courts was accordingly not entertained by post 
Sidumo LAC judgments, as they disregarded the test set out in Sidumo, and to the 
contrary, formulated the basis of their judgments on the minority’s view in Sidumo. 
Such non-reliance on the Sidumo test by the trilogy judgments270 caused the relaxation 
of the grounds of review and the subsequent effortless interference by Labour Court 
judges.  This straightforward approach was based on the mere failure by the 
commissioner to consider the material facts that might “potentially” cause an 
unreasonable, substantive outcome, causing the award to be set aside and making it 
thus easier to succeed on review.  The deviation of the Sidumo contour, however, 
caused the Supreme Court of Appeal to step in and correct the broad approach 
established by the trilogy judgments, in particular the LAC judgment of Herholdt. The 
SCA confirmed the suffusion of the notion of reasonableness as set out in Sidumo and 
relied on a more holistic approach, narrowing the scope for interference and in the 
process preserving the distinction between appeal and review.    
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In summation, concerning the current position in our law, the development of the review 
function of the Labour Court affords an aggrieved party an opportunity to approach the 
court and challenge the award of the commissioner.  Provided firstly, that in terms of 
Sidumo, the Labour Court is satisfied that the decision reached by the commissioner 
is not one that a reasonable decision-maker could have reached and secondly, in terms 
of Herholdt (SCA), that the result arrived at by the commissioner is unreasonable and 
in the event of errors of fact committed by such commissioner, it can only be 
reviewable, if the effect of such error renders the outcome to be unreasonable.  
 
The Sidumo contour seems to have been concluded for now.  However, there is no 
doubt that the Labour Court’s review function will be developed once again in the near 
future.  The question, however, remains, to which extent?  Shall we see the Labour 
Courts reverting to a more relaxed approach, seeing it fit to challenge the limits of 
interference of arbitration awards, or will the Labour Court continue to develop this 
strict, controlled advance based on reasonableness?   
 
As for now, the notion of reasonableness is thus the pivot of the review test and future 
development.  Reasonableness ingrain a sense of structure and finality to the grounds 
for review and is seen as the rational factor concerning the review of arbitration awards.  
A comparable line can be drawn with the Sidumo contour, as reasonableness is a 
constant dynamic in the development of the review test. The origin of the 
reasonableness concept in review proceedings, is obviously found in the suffusion of 
the Constitutional standard of reasonableness into the section 145 grounds for review.  
Hence, the concept of reasonableness forms the ultimate foundation in such review 
proceedings.      
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CHAPTER 6 
THE NOTION OF REASONABLENESS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The significance of the notion of reasonableness in the judicial review of arbitration 
awards was comprehensively accentuated in the course of this treatise.  
Reasonableness, without a specific legal meaning, has integrated our law as one of 
the standards for judicial review for administrative action, construed in section 33(1) of 
the Constitution.  The abovementioned section provides that everyone has the right to 
administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.  The use of 
reasonableness thus in such context, as confirmed by the suffusion of reasonableness 
into section 145 of the LRA,271 means that if the administrative action is deemed not to 
be reasonable, the matter is reviewable.  No specific meaning can be induced to 
reasonableness; thus the chapter will proceed in a brief consideration of the elements 
of reasonableness, setting out and considering rationality and proportionality.  
Although the hypothesis of the subject matter is important, it is the origin and nature of 
the application of reasonableness that must form part of an in-depth consideration. 
 
The encapsulation of the notion of reasonableness and subsequent application of 
same in our labour jurisprudence were introduced by Bato Star Fishing v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 272  when it made reference to the so-called 
“Wednesbury reasonableness test”.  Such reference to English Law was consequently 
endorsed by Navsa J, in Sidumo and thus paved the way to set the platform for the 
confirmation that commissioners exercise administrative action and the subsequent 
suffusion of section 145 with the notion of reasonableness, 273  culminating in the 
establishment of the so-called “Sidumo test”.  However, the comparable nature 
between South Africa and the United Kingdom (UK) jurisprudence, should be 
considered against the backdrop of each jurisdictions dispute-resolution system and 
subsequent judicial-review procedure, in particular the extent of the notion of 
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reasonableness.  Therefore, the chapter will set out a comparative study of the UK`s 
dispute resolution system, as well as the nature of judicial appeal and review.  
 
The purpose of such comparison is to recognise the problem within the application of 
our review proceedings and present a platform for future development of our review 
test, particularly the reconfiguration of the CCMA composition and the endorsement 
and development of a narrow application to review proceedings. 
 
6.2 THE SUFFUSED NOTION OF REASONABLENESS 
 
According to Sidumo, the notion of reasonableness entrenched in section 33(1) of the 
Constitution is suffused into section 145 of the LRA.274  Hence, the suffused notion of 
reasonableness stems from “reasonable administrative action”275 and thus as a result, 
equates to administrative law.  It is consequently accepted in our law that in an 
administrative-law sense, the notion of reasonableness comprises of two elements,276 
rationality and proportionality.  
 
6.2.1 RATIONALITY  
 
Rationality is one facet of reasonableness277 and in essence it means that a decision 
must be supported by evidence and information before the commissioner, as well as 
the reason given for it.278  A decision, based on the support of the evidence and 
material, is thus irrational, if it is unreasoned and lacking perceived logic or clear 
justification.279  An example of an irrational decision is where there is an absence of a 
logical connection between the evidence and material before the commissioner as well 
as the apparent reasons for the decision.280  The abovementioned consideration was 
adequately surmised by the LAC judgment in Carephone:281   
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“Is there a rational objective basis justifying the conclusion made by the 
administrative decision-maker between the material properly available to him and 
the conclusion he or she eventually arrived at?”282 
 
The summation was thus applied and approved by the SCA in Trinity Broadcasting v 
Independent Communications Authority of South Africa, 283  which consequently 
recognised rationality284 as a ground for review.285  
 
However, in Sidumo, the Constitutional Court was more concerned with the 
constitutional standard of reasonableness, encapsulated in section 33(1) of the 
Constitution, than the specific grounds of review in the PAJA.286  Therefore, the fact 
that Sidumo focused particularly on reasonableness only and being silent as to 
rationality, is indicative that the two grounds might come to the same thing. 287  
However, according to Hoexter: “they should certainly continue to be regarded as 
separate and more or less independent grounds of review – not only because the PAJA 
lists them as separately but also because reasonableness goes beyond mere 
rationality”.288 (own emphases). 
 
As established, the terms rationality and reasonableness are often used 
interchangeably, however, rationality is only one facet of reasonableness and not all 
there is to reasonableness.289 
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6.2.2 PROPORTIONALITY  
 
The notion of proportionality requires the decision-maker to achieve a fair balance290 
and thus “to avoid the imbalance between the adverse and beneficial effects of an 
action and to encourage the administrator to consider both the need for the action and 
the possible use of less drastic or oppressive means to accomplish the desired end”.291  
The fundamentals that are thus drawn from the notion292 are the balance of relevant 
considerations293 and the appropriateness or acceptability294 of the decision.  The 
notion may be basically defined as “to use a sledgehammer to crack a nut”.295  
 
Even though the notion of proportionality derives from German law,296 it is very similar 
to the so-called “Wednesbury reasonableness test”, where Lord Greene, M.R. stated 
that the courts can only interfere if a decision: 
 
“is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever come to it”.297   
 
Although vague and confusing, this formulation endeavours to point out that judges 
should not lightly interfere with the decisions of officials.298  In exercising their powers 
of review, the judges ought not to place themselves in the position of the competent 
authority and test such decision in accordance with their own sense of reasonableness. 
In doing this, the court will engage in considering the merits of the decision. 299  
Therefore, according to Lord Greene in Wednesbury, unreasonableness under his 
definition would require something overwhelming.300 
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There have subsequently been various attempts to reformulate the Wednesbury test, 
however, such reformulation amounts to no more than a helpful guide to the 
parameters.301  Lord Cooke, in R v Chief Constable of Sussex,302 regretted the fact 
that the Wednesbury formula had been established in the UK courts and beyond.303  
Lord Cooke subsequently relied upon a more simple test of: 
 
“whether the decision in question was one which a reasonable authority could 
reach.”304  
 
It is the abovementioned view and dictum that were cited in Bato Star Fishing, 
confirming the confusing nature of the Wednesbury test and that the approach of 
Lord Cooke provides proper sound guidance: 
 
“In determining the proper meaning of section 6(2)(h) of PAJA in the light of the 
overall constitutional obligation upon administrative decision-makers to act 
reasonably.”305 
 
“Section 6(2)(h) should then be understood to require a simple test, namely, that 
an administrative decision will be reviewable if, in Lord Cooke’s words, it is one 
that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach.”306 
 
This approach was accordingly endorsed by the Honourable Acting Judge Navsa in 
Sidumo: 
 
“The reasonableness standard was dealt with in Bato Star. In the context of section 
6(2)(h) of PAJA, O’Regan J said the following: “[A]n administrative decision will be 
reviewable if, in Lord Cooke’s words, it is one that a reasonable decision-maker 
could not reach.”307 
 
This subsequently paved the way to set the platform for the confirmation that 
commissioners exercise administrative action with subsequent suffusion of section 145 
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of the LRA with the concept of reasonableness308 and the resulting establishment of 
the so-called “Sidumo test”.  With the application of the Wednesbury standard 
preferred by the UK courts, reasonableness is a more stringent test, based on a 
standard requiring perversity, 309  irrationality or extreme unreasonableness, in 
comparison to such application in South Africa.  The extent of the application of the 
notion of reasonableness in South Africa, compared to the application in the UK, should 
thus be considered and analysed.  
  
6.3 THE COMPARATIVE ELEMENT OF REASONABLENESS WITHIN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM`S LEGAL SYSTEM 
 
With the reliance on Lord Cooke’s dictum, Sidumo ultimately reached the conclusion 
that the requirement of reasonableness for just administrative action must be suffused 
into section 145.  Accordingly, our labour jurisprudence was influenced by English 
administrative law. 310   It therefore warrants assessing whether the notion of 
reasonableness is applied similarly to that of Employment Law in the UK, and 
consequently, the comparative nature of the application of reasonableness between 
South Africa and the UK.  An apparent and logical commencement of such comparison 
is the practical application of the notion of reasonableness and, in particular, the 
respective judicial medium that initiates such application. 
 
Employment-dispute resolution in the UK comprises of a twofold system, based on the 
Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) Arbitration Scheme,311 which 
provides that aggrieved parties to unfair dismissal disputes, may after conciliation, 
agree in writing to refer their dispute to arbitration by an arbitrator appointed by ACAS, 
as an alternative to the Employment Tribunal (ET) hearings. 312   The alternative 
arbitration introduced by ACAS, adopts an inquisitorial approach,313 providing for a 
more informal, speedier, more private and less costly alternative314 to an Employment 
Tribunal case.  Legal representation is not necessary and strict adherence to legal 
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principles and legal precedents will not be entertained, even though the arbitrator 
makes an award which is binding on the parties.315  It could thus be said that the 
arbitration proceedings in accordance with ACAS is a great deal similar to that of the 
CCMA.  However, contrary to that of the ETs,316 there is an exclusion of an appeal 
procedure, which provides that the parties may appeal only in instances of a serious 
irregularity.  Therefore, for the purpose of analysing and comparing the practical 
application of Reasonableness, the judicial medium of Employment Tribunal`s takes 
preference.  
 
6.3.1 EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS AND THE CCMA 
 
In order to assess the intended comparison and attaining the ultimate conclusion, the 
jurisdiction, procedure, composition as well as the appeal and review procedure of the 
ETs are considered and consequently compared to those of the CCMA.  Such 
comparison, in particular the evaluation of the composition and appeal and review 
procedure, identifies the dilemma in the application of review proceedings in our labour 
jurisprudence. 
 
6.3.1.1 EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS 
 
ETs form part of a specialised system of inferior labour courts in the UK,317 with its 
jurisdiction expanded to cover almost all the statutory individual rights, for instance, 
complaints of unfair dismissal, redundancy payment, failure to consult over proposed 
redundancies, equal pay, breach of employment provisions of legislation, unjustifiable 
discipline, etc.318  The procedure governing the ETs is the Employment Tribunals 
regulations 2013319 and, in contrast to the CCMA, the adversarial system prevails, 
shifting the responsibility on each party to present and prove its own case, with no 
investigating power by the commissioner and no power to promote or order a 
compromise between the parties.320  The nature of the system consequently creates 
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the need for legal representation, unlike the CCMA, where such legal representation 
is not common.321 
 
Conversely, the Employment Tribunals, like the CCMA, act much more speedily than 
ordinary courts and, with national jurisdiction, are more accessible to complainants.322  
Even though ETs are subject to the adversarial system, they are more informal, with 
no complicated pleadings and not bound by normal rules of evidence.323 
 
A significant and interesting distinction between Employment Tribunals and the CCMA, 
is its tripartite composition.324   The ETs consist of a legal chairman and two lay 
members.  The legal chairman is required to have at least seven years’ experience as 
a solicitor or barrister and is drawn from a panel of chairmen appointed by the Lord 
Chancellor. 325   The two lay members, one with employment and the other with 
industrial experience,326 are selected on a part-time basis from a panel drawn up after 
consultations with employers’ organisations and trade unions. 327   In South Africa 
however, irrespective of whether there is only one presiding commissioner, the 
governing body of the CCMA may simply appoint an adequately qualified person328 as 
a commissioner and no need for legal qualifications is required.  The presumption may 
thus be made that Employment Tribunals, with their tripartite legal-experience 
background, are superior to and more capable in assessing the merits of a matter than 
the commissioners of the CCMA.  Consequently, in contrast to the CCMA, such 
superior judgments are of a better quality, 329  resulting in a different nature and 
application of review and appeal proceedings.  
 
Arguably, the core-functioning of ETs and the CCMA is different, in particular its 
composition.  Hence, the comparison between the two legal systems consequently 
identifies a key consequence of the CCMA’s composition, namely the interference of 
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the commissioners’ awards by our courts.  The basis of such identification is reliant on 
the comparison between the appeal and review proceedings of the two systems, which 
ultimately depends on the notion of reasonableness.  
 
Even though our labour legislation and jurisprudence are suffused with the notion of 
reasonableness derived from administrative law and consequently influenced by Lord 
Cooke’s dictum set out in Bato Star and confirmed in Sidumo,330 the subsequent 
consideration is in respect of the UK’s inferior courts and not administrative tribunals.  
 
6.3.1.2 REVIEW AND APPEAL PROCEDURES 
 
In the UK, an application for review may be made only on the ground that there has 
been an error in the proceedings and may not be based on the contention that the 
employment tribunal has committed an error in law.331  Such contention must be 
entertained through an appeal process to the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT).332  
 
In order to succeed in such an application to the EAT, it must be established that the 
ET “misdirected themselves in law, or entertained the wrong issue, or proceeded on a 
misapprehension or misconstruction of the evidence, or taken matters into account 
which were irrelevant to the decision, or reached a decision which no reasonable 
employment tribunal, properly directing themselves in law, could have arrived at”.333  
 
The first four of the aforementioned grounds are very similar to Ngcobo’s gross 
irregularity dictum, 334  where the commissioner commits a latent irregularity, 335 
occurring in the mind of the commissioner at the time of writing the award, and where 
it appears that the material facts were ignored, causing the commissioner to 
misconceive the whole nature of the enquiry.336  The latter, based on reasonableness, 
is identical to the notion encapsulated in Sidumo and subsequent suffusion into section 
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145.  Debatably, with reference to section 145 of the LRA, our review proceedings are 
a combination of the UK’s appeal and review actions. 
 
The issue, however, is the application of the notion of reasonableness and the measure 
of interference by the courts.  In the UK, the EAT would not normally interfere with 
decisions of the ETs, unless if it is possible to say, according to Lord Justice May:337 
“My word, that was certainly wrong!”338  If there are reasonable grounds to support the 
decision, the EAT would not interfere and will thus only do same if there has been a 
measure of extreme unreasonableness. 339   In East Berkshire Health Authority v 
Matadeen 340  the EAT held that “perversity” is a ground for interference with an 
employment tribunal’s decision, in the event where such decision “was not a 
permissible option” or was “a conclusion that offends reason” or “so outrages in its 
defiance of logic or of acceptable standards of industrial relations”.341  The principle of 
none interference is based on the premise that the lay members of the tribunal ought 
to exercise their experience and industrial judgment concerning questions of law and 
decisions to be reached.342  Accordingly, the consideration and weight to be attached 
to the evidence remains the sole task of the ET and it is thus not permissible for the 
EAT to replace the outcome of the decision with their own views.343  
 
Contrary to the approach in the UK, the South African Labour Courts tend to exploit 
the reasonable decision-maker and rationality test, by endorsing a more relaxed 
approach to the application of reasonableness and gross irregularity.344  Hence, in 
assessing whether the decision was not one that a reasonable decision-maker could 
have arrived at, the door is opened for the Labour Court to interfere and consequently 
permit “merit reviews”.345  In practice some of our Labour Court judges are prepared 
to go further than others when it comes to the reviewing of the merits, even though it 
is contended that they are upholding the distinction between appeal and review and 
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are not concerned with the correctness of the decision.346  Even with the recent re-
establishment and development of the Sidumo test and consequent stringent test to 
be applied by our Labour Courts347  in review proceedings, it will not necessarily 
prevent such interference in its totality.  The problem is consequently to establish the 
cause of such interference and the prevention thereof subsequently.  
 
Guidance is sought by the mode of the approach and composition of the United 
Kingdom’s ETs.  The reality of the matter is that the EAT seldom interferes with the 
decisions of the ETs and if so, only in cases of extreme unreasonableness.  The 
premise of such limited interference is fairly obvious: the reason lies in the composition 
of the ETs, and as a result of such composition, the strict test applied by the EAT for 
unreasonableness.  
 
To put it in perspective, the EAT will not necessarily interfere with a decision of a ET, 
while being well aware that the basis of such decision was formulated and made by a 
legal chairman with seven years’ legal experience as a solicitor and two lay members 
with extensive experience in industry and employment respectively.  The lay members, 
acting as neutral arbiters, rely on their experience in industrial relations to enhance the 
quality of the decision.348  The tripartite structure provides for one equal vote by each 
member, and taking into account the diverse background of the members, 96% of all 
decisions reached are unanimous, including decisions where the legal chairman does 
not have the support of one of the “wingmen” and are thus outvoted by the two lay 
members.349   
 
Therefore, in comparing such advanced composition with that of the CCMA, it is 
apparent that our requirements for the appointment of CCMA commissioners are 
inferior.  Section 117 of the LRA merely provides that: 
 
“(1) The governing body must appoint as Commissioners as many adequately 
qualified persons as it considers necessary to perform the functions of 
commissioners by or in terms of this Act or any other law.”   
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According to the CCMA,350 the Commissioners are appointed by the Governing Body 
of the CCMA on the strength of their experience and expertise in labour matters, 
particularly dispute prevention and dispute resolution.  In addition, the CCMA 
Commissioner Appointment and Recruitment Process 351  sets out minimum 
requirements for appointment of an entry level – level B Commissioner.  It provides 
that such aspirant applicant must have at least four years’ experience in industrial 
relations, labour law or conducting conciliations, arbitrations and facilitations, 
supported by relevant tertiary qualifications or NQF 5 equivalent, preferably in labour 
law, good knowledge of labour law, good knowledge of conciliation, arbitration and 
mediation processes and principles, good knowledge of the labour market and the 
different relevant factors.352 
 
In some instances, such “adequately qualified” commissioners possess a measure of 
experience and expertise that is more advanced than most legal practitioners, and the 
assertion made is not done without the necessary respect towards the majority of the 
CCMA commissioners.  However, the interference by the Labour Court judges is based 
on the disproportionate gap in legal knowledge, legal experience, legal qualifications, 
legal skill and interpretation of our labour jurisprudence and labour legislation.  Before 
stepping up to the bench, the majority of these Labour Court judges, practised for 
decades as advocates and attorneys and thus litigated on a daily basis.  Measured 
down to the minimum requirements for the appointment as a commissioner, the 
disproportionate gap in legal knowledge, experience and qualifications is evident.  It is 
thus as a result of such imbalance, which warrants the subjective perception by the 
Labour Court judges, that the majority of the CCMA commissioners are lacking the 
required ability to assess the legal issues and apply their minds to the merits and 
judgment of the case, and so come to the conclusion that the decision reached by a 
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commissioner is not one that a reasonable decision-maker could have reached on the 
evidential material available.353  
 
6.4 CONCLUSION  
 
The notion of reasonableness is the decisive test applied by our labour courts in review 
proceedings and is confined within the restored and redeveloped Sidumo test.  The 
origin of reasonableness in the review of employment matters, is based on an 
administrative-law influence354 and the Wednesbury test, conveyed into our labour 
jurisprudence by Bato Star Fishing and expanded upon by Sidumo.  As established 
and confirmed by the preceding chapters, the notion of reasonableness is surmised 
within the test applied to establish whether the decision reached by the commissioner 
is one that a reasonable decision-maker could not have reached with the evidential 
material available. 
 
The need for the restitution and subsequent development of the abovementioned test, 
is based on the assertion that a more relaxed test simplifies the interference by Labour 
Court judges with the awards of the commissioners, and thus breaches the common 
line between appeals and reviews.  Such merit reviews are in conflict with the true 
intention of the legislature.  The attempt to narrow the scope of interference is found in 
the Sidumo test.  However, even though the test is characterized by stricter grounds 
than in the past,355 the test remains a double-edged sword, hinging upon the notion of 
reasonableness.  
 
Even though reasonableness must now be added as one of the section 145 grounds 
in order to set aside the award, the notion nevertheless also creates a backdoor for 
Labour Court judges to partake in the consideration of the merits of the award.  
Applying a lighter test for unreasonableness, in comparison with the more stringent 
test for gross unreasonableness in the UK, prompts the Labour Court judges to without 
doubting consider the merits of the case.  With a greater tolerance for 
unreasonableness, the majority of Labour Court judges assess whether the decision 
                                                          
353  Van Tonder Labour Court Practice 300. 
354  S 33(1) of the Constitution. 
355  Supra Chap 5. 
65 
reached by the commissioner is one that a reasonable decision-maker could not have 
reached and consequently find that the decision has been in fact in accordance with 
the thinking of a reasonable decision-maker. 
 
The derivation of such finding by the Labour Court is, however, the interference with 
the award itself.  Such interference originates in the subjective consideration of the 
Labour Court judge, that the commissioner’s capability to adjudge the merits and apply 
the law accordingly, is not adequate.  Such subjective contemplation is based on the 
gap between Labour Court judges and commissioners.  Our Labour Court judges, 
unlike the EAT in the UK, breach the fine line between appeal and review to assess 
whether the commissioner has made the correct decision, and consequently alter the 
result if it “is not one that a reasonable decision-maker could have made”. 
 
In order to prevent such mistrust in the legal abilities of our commissioners, it is my 
respectful view that the CCMA need to re-evaluate the recruitment, training and 
appointment of commissioners.  It is agreed that a carbon copy of the United Kingdom’s 
Employment Tribunals’ composition would not be financially viable within the budget 
constraints of the CCMA and therefore interfere with our expeditious resolution 
regarding the dispute structure, as there are not sufficient resources to establish a 
tripartite commission, nor to appoint senior attorneys or advocates on a comprehensive 
basis.  However, subject to non-discrimination, the CCMA may be able to give 
preference to legal practitioners with relevant qualifications and experience, followed 
by a process where non-legal practitioners are appointed on the premise that they at 
least have a tertiary qualification in labour law and eight years’ experience in an 
industrial-relations capacity.  Such a proposal to attain formal qualifications is not 
unfounded. In 2013, the CCMA356 embarked on an initiative to partner with Public 
Universities357 “to develop and deliver a qualification in Labour-Resolution Practice”, 
which will in due course replace the current CCMA candidate-training programme.358  
The qualification will be at a post-graduate level, equivalent to a NQF level 8 and intend 
to “prepare graduates who are ready for practice, both skilled and well-rounded 
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practitioners”.  The qualification will include “all core aspects of the current CCMA 
commissioner training; training in substantive law and in-depth technical skills training 
on arbitration and conciliation; components on soft-skills, social justice, ethics, diversity 
and other topics”.359  The programme commenced in 2014. 
 
Consequently, such qualification and proposed increased level of eight years’ required 
experience, together with the suggested preference to legal practitioners, attempt to 
the narrow the gap between the Labour Court judges and CCMA commissioners.  
Ultimately, Labour Court judges will always have superior understanding and 
application of the law.  However, the perception that our CCMA commissioners are not 
able to reach a decision that a reasonable decision-maker could have reached, could 
be avoided by instilling a sense confidence in our commissioners, based on the 
increased level of knowledge and skill within the broad labour-relations arena in South 
Africa.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
In considering and analysing the contour of Sidumo, the principal objective of this 
treatise was to identify the correct test to be applied in review proceedings stemming 
from the CCMA.  The consideration and analyses of the development of the review 
test were based on various judgments seeking to expand upon such test.  Sidumo, 
was obviously the primary consideration, forming the basis and departure of the 
contour, followed by a trilogy of contentious Labour Appeal Court judgments, deluding 
the contour with an inexact development, resulting in a wider application of the review 
test.  Such deviation from Sidumo impelled the Supreme Court of Appeal and an 
ensuing judgment in the Labour Court to rectify such misapplication, by reaffirming the 
application of the Sidumo test and supporting a narrower and stringent approach, thus 
maintaining the strict distinction between appeal and review.  A further objective, 
deriving from the principal purpose of this treatise, was to consider the proverbial 
distinction between appeal and review and the consequent extent of the distortion of 
such distinction, caused by the interference of our Labour Court judges in the awards 
of the commissioners.  The treatise’s objectives were integrated by a constant and 
continuous thread of reasonableness, forming the basis for the Sidumo test and 
application of the interference by our Labour Court judges.  
 
The Sidumo contour was based on the standard of review, set out by the majority in 
the Sidumo judgment and supported by the notion of reasonableness.  It was confirmed 
that a reviewing court must ensure that a commissioner’s decision falls within the 
bounds of reasonableness.  The court delegated with such determination, should 
enquire whether such is one that a reasonable decision-maker could not have reached.  
Such consideration formed the basis for the Sidumo contour.  The Sidumo tests set 
the platform for sound jurisprudential development, seeking to preserve the true 
intention of the legislature and to maintain the differentiation between appeals and 
reviews. 
 
An additional consideration and assessment had to be made of the three controversial 
judgments.  Gaga, Afrox Healthcare and Herholdt sought to clarify the approach 
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adopted by Sidumo, and endorsed a wider application to review proceedings, 
confirming that CCMA awards can be reviewed on section 145 grounds and on the 
basis of unreasonableness.  Moreover, the approach was more simplified in Herholdt, 
in finding that a mere failure by a commissioner to consider the material facts that might 
potentially cause an unreasonable substantive outcome, causes the award to be set 
aside.  Such non-reliance on the Sidumo test was caused the relaxation of the grounds 
of review and the subsequent ardent interference by Labour Court judges.  Such 
divergence from the Sidumo contour was averted by the Supreme Court of Appeal 
judgment on Herholdt and subsequent Labour Appeal Court judgment in Gold Fields.  
In particular, the SCA judgment of Herholdt contained the decisive response 
emphasized in the objective of the treatise.  The SCA confirmed the suffusion of the 
notion of reasonableness as set out in Sidumo and relied on a more holistic approach, 
narrowing the scope for interference by Labour Court judges, preserving the distinction 
between appeal and review and in the process, culminating the Sidumo contour. 
 
The primary finding of this treatise concerns the current position in our law relating to 
the test for review.  The premise of such review test to applied by our Labour Courts, 
affords an aggrieved party to approach the court and challenge the award of the 
commissioner.  Such challenge would only be entertained if the Labour Court is 
satisfied that the decision reached by the commissioner, is not one that a reasonable 
decision-maker could have reached in the court, and that the result arrived at by the 
commissioner is unreasonable.  
 
In considering the distinction between appeal and review and the subsequent extent of 
the distortion of such distinction, the true intention of the legislature was emphasised 
and analysed.  However, it was the comparative study made with the relevant law of 
the United Kingdom, that identified the defect in the application of our review 
proceedings, in creating a backdoor for our Labour Court judges to consider the merits 
or not of a specific case.  
 
In comparing our labour jurisprudence with that of the United Kingdom, it was found 
that the test of unreasonableness applied by our courts, is clearly lighter than the 
stringent test for gross unreasonableness applied in the United Kingdom.  In addition, 
it was found that the composition of the United Kingdom’s Employment Tribunal, is to 
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a larger extent based on legal experience and legal qualifications than the composition 
of the CCMA.  
 
The resulting secondary finding of the treatise underlines the light test of 
unreasonableness applied by our courts and the measure of distrust in the ability of 
our commissioners, consequently confirming the backdoor for our labour court judges, 
enabling them to consider the merits of the dispute without difficulty and finding that 
the decision reached by the commissioner is one that a reasonable decision-maker 
could not have reached.  The extent of interference into the merits is thus established 
and accentuated against the strict backdrop of the United Kingdom’s limited 
interference.   
 
Even though the Sidumo contour concluded with the contemporary SCA and LAC 
judgments, there is the capacity for a great deal of further development in our labour-
law jurisprudence and labour-law judicial system, in particular the review test.  In order 
to abide by the legislature’s true intention and maintain the distinction between appeal 
and review, the required development of such review test should entail a stricter and 
narrower approach, based on gross unreasonableness, as reflected in the comparative 
study.  The judicial structure is currently also in a phase of development and will as 
well require a narrowed approach to commissioner recruitment.  All things considered, 
our labour-law jurisprudence and judicial system should constantly evolve to fit our 
constitutional needs and social order as well as employment demands, which will 
ultimately be dictated by our courts interpretation of lawfulness, reasonableness and 
fairness.  
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